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This report was commissioned through the Palmer Development Group 
(www.pdg.co.za) by the National Business Initiative (www.nbi.org.za) in partnership 
with Inwent (www.inwent.de) to provide some documented contribution to 
information available on actual and perceived impacts of so-called PPPs (Public-
Private Partnerships) in the delivery of services.  The intent of NBI and Inwent is to 
utilise the products of this work to influence capacity-building projects with various 
stakeholders involved in PPP-related processes. 
 
The report would not have been possible without the contribution of time and 
information by all those interviewed.  For this I am most grateful, especially under 
circumstances where key informants are suffering from a degree of research fatigue.  
In all instances efforts have been made to ensure that views expressed have been 
captured correctly and that opportunities have been provided for comment on this as a 
working document in its earlier stages. 
 
Extensive use has also been made other reports done on the concession.  Drawing on 
these documents enabled comment to be made about perception changes over time 
and access to information that would not have been otherwise possible in the confines 
of this study. 
 
I am also grateful for the assistance of Robynne Hansmann who assisted with local 
knowledge gained from her role as a Town Planner and researcher and Lucy Paul with 
editing.  Support and insights provided by colleagues at the School of Development 
Studies, Univeristy of KwaZulu Natal was much appreciated. 
 
Written comments on earlier drafts were generously provided by Asha Bassa, Mark 
Hultzer, Mark Pickering, Kathy Tyacke and the project commissioning entities in the 
form of staff of NBI and Inwent.  Verbal comment was provided by staff of the 
Ilembe District Municipality. 
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1. Introduction 
Two case studies were commissioned by the National Business Initiative (NBI) with the 
overall purpose of exploring achievements, failures and obstacles to the development of 
Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs) in South Africa. It is intended that the   studies will 
contribute to existing dialogue on PPPs. Also training needs identified by the case studies 
are planned to assist the development of capacity building programmes that aim to 
optimise the positive impacts of PPPs. A conference planned for mid-2004 will bring key 
role players together to discuss alternative service delivery mechanisms and related 
capacity building requirements. Lessons drawn from the case studies will contribute to 
the proceedings.   
To ensure that the a variety of national/provincial and local government level issues were 
illustrated in the case studies the NBI decided that a case study should be undertaken in 
both of these spheres of government. The sectors chosen for investigation are water and 
eco-tourism. The water sector enables assessment of PPP impacts on a municipal level 
basic service. Eco-tourism was chosen because it is a national service that   lends itself to 
public–private cooperation due to the growing market for tourism.  
1.1 Objectives 
The objectives of the case studies are:  
• Identify key areas in PPP development where further investigation and debate are 
required. 
• Provide insight into systems and processes necessary to maximise achievements 
and limit negative impacts arising from the use of PPPs. 
• Increase understanding amongst stakeholders in public and private sectors of 
alternative service delivery approaches that aim to improve the sustainability and 
efficiency of public services. 
• Contribute to the debate about the usefulness and consequences of PPPs in South 
Africa and internationally so as to assist in paving a way forward for more 
consensual and collaborative national PPP strategy.  
1.2     Key research questions 
The following research questions were agreed upon: 
• Why were the two PPPs established, what were their objectives and to what extent 
have these been met? What have been positive and negative impacts of the PPP? 
What factors contributed to these?  
• Relative to service delivery prior to the PPP what has the PPP achieved in terms 
of efficiency, quality, accessibility and coverage in service delivery? What were 
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financial impacts in terms of tariffs charged to consumers, capital finance and 
financial benefits to the public partner?   
• What consequences has the PPP had for labour in terms of job creation, 
retrenchments, salaries, general working conditions? Have unions or organised 
labour been involved in the PPP at any level and what is their perspective of it?  
• What are perspectives of stakeholders in the water and eco-tourism sectors on 
how these specific PPPs will impact on future treatment of PPP options in those 
sectors? 
• What are specific training needs and target groups that will benefit? 
Two key focus areas identified for the case studies are:  
a) service delivery such efficiency, quality, finances, catchment and affordability  
b) Labour relations issues such as conditions of service, job creation, transfers, 
retrenchments and working environment.   
1.3 Selection of case studies 
The water sector PPP selected for investigation is the Ilembe Municipality –Siza Water 
partnership in Kwa-Zulu Natal involving the awarding of a concession to a provide 
operator  provide water services. In the eco-tourism sector the PPP selected is the South 
African National Parks (SAN Parks) – Natures Group concession whereby restaurants 
and shops in the Kruger National Park were outsourced.  The reasons these two PPPs 
were chosen is:  
c) they illustrate issues that arise from the substantial transfer of risk from public to 
private partners 
d) Because services were in place prior to these concessions being awarded 
comparison of the impact of the PPPs with a baseline scenario is possible.   
e) The PPPs are two of the few in the country that have progressed to a stage of 
relative maturity and hence offer the opportunity for some tracking of impact and 
experiences over time and related reflection that would accompany such an 
analysis; and 
f) The PPP offers insight into factors such as institutional change in contracting 
parties and experience of addressing periods of crisis useful in drawing out in 
terms of lessons and recommendations.  
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2. Summary: Ilembe-Siza Water concession1 
In January 1999 the Borough of Dolphin Coast and Siza Water Company (with a 
controlling interest by SAUR Services of France) entered into a contract whereby SWC 
would oversee manage and implement the provision of water and sanitation services 
within the then BODC Municipal boundary, on a concession basis, for a period of 30 
years.  The project had its origins in a decision by the BODC in 1996 that it was best able 
to meet its obligations with respect to WSS by seeking partnerships with the private 
sector.  A three year process then unfolded during which, with support from various 
government agencies and departments, the BODC investigated PPP options, chose a 
preferred route and secured the interest of potential service providers.  At the contract 
date the net present value of the concession was estimated to be in the region of R386m 
(www.miiu.org.za).  The concession has been operational for almost four years and is 
beginning to reach a level of maturity.  Due to legislation-induced local government 
restructuring the BODC no longer exists an entity and therefore the concession contract is 
now being handled by the Ilembe District Municipality. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Baseline vs. current data 
In order to assess impact, where data is available, the prior service is compared with that 
provided after awarding of the contract.  
3.2 Selection of indicators  
3.2.1 Initial selection 
To provide a basis for analysis an initial selection of indicators was made that broadly 
applied to both water and eco-tourism sectors before and after the partnerships – using 
the two focus areas identified - labour and service delivery.   
a) Service Delivery 
Efficiency is assessed by making broad comparisons between the financial, quality 




o Income  
o Price 
                                                     
1
 A map of the concession area is provided in the annexure. 
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• Market size 
• Quality of service 
• Perspectives on service delivery 
a) Labour issues 
• Total employees/payroll 
• Conditions of service 
• Skills development  
• Perspectives of labour relations 
3.3 Semi-structured interviews: 
Interviews with five key role-players have taken place during which the objectives of the 
partnership were assessed. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected for each phase 
of the partnership using the indicators outlined above.   
3.4 Secondary data 
Where auditing, surveying or analysis had been undertaken or commissioned by any of 
the stakeholders this information was analysed for use in the case study.   
3.5 Sector- specific indicators 
Based on data made available from interviews as evidence and input of stakeholders 
regarding the usefulness of indicators in reflecting impact - sector specific indicators 
were selected for comparing the prior service to that provided after the awarding of the 
concession.  
3.6 Methodological issues pertaining to the water sector PPP 
In order to access perspectives of stakeholders and documented information on the case 
study a combination of research approaches has been utilised.  In the first instance 
extensive use has been made of secondary sources such as academic studies, stakeholder 
reviews and supplemented with electronic and print media sources.  This has been 
complemented by a range of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders identified 
in a schematic manner in the overall project methodology (ie deemed to be important 
“constituency” commentators by NBI/Inwent) and identified by the stakeholders 
themselves.  Some informal canvassing of views of residents of the project was 
undertaken but by-and-large comment from this perspective is drawn from existing 
secondary sources as resources did not allow for a more extensive survey methodology.  
Site visits in the Dolphin Coast and Ilembe area were also undertaken (Groutville, Etete, 
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Nkobongo, Stanger, Ballito, Sheffield Beach, Shakaskraal, Umhlali, Shakashead) to get 
first hand experience of delivery sites and facilities of KwaDukuza Municipality, Ilembe 
Municipality and Siza Water. 
 
Particular effort has been made within this study to obtain quantitative information to 
enable some analysis in parallel to documenting perspectives of some key stakeholders.  
It should be emphasised upfront that, despite a considerable level of information 
available and research conducted, there have been significant constraints apparent in 
obtaining reliable and comparable information – specifically relating to pre-concession 
conditions.  Matters of governance, as well as issues relating to monitoring and 
evaluation will also be discussed as these are critical from a stakeholder perspective in 
examining the concession. 
4. Background 
Before examining the evolution of the concession in some depth it is necessary to sketch 
some background information relating to the local area.  Information is also provided on 
how policy, with regard to local government service delivery – and water (and sanitation) 
service delivery in particular – has developed in South Africa in the last few years.  A 
discussion of stakeholder perspectives on this process will conclude this section of the 
report. 
 
4.1 Legislative and policy context 
Since national democratic elections took place in 1994 there has been a protracted 
process of municipal restructuring which has comprehensively transformed the form and 
focus of local governance arrangements.  These processes reached their peak with 
approval of the Municipal Systems (2000) and Municipal Structures Acts (1998) and the 
related processes of demarcation and local elections which gave effect to the content of 
this legislation.  The combined impact of constitutional imperatives, national policy and 
voicing of local needs has witnessed much attention been given to the matter of how 
municipal level government can best give effect to their core business of service delivery 
in a context of severe inherited inequalities in service provision resulting from apartheid 
era decision-making.  In particular, the matter of provision of water services has attracted 
much attention both because of government’s own focus on this issue and because of its 
status as an essential, yet scarce, life-sustaining resource.  This report examines the 
evolution of a public-private partnership arrangement to deliver water (and sanitation) 
services to communities originally falling within the boundaries of the Borough of 
Dolphin Coast (BODC) municipality to the north of Durban on the north coast of 
KwaZulu-Natal.2 
 
                                                     
2
 Today the area falls within the KwaDukuza Municipality, however, the concession responsibility has been shifted to 
the Ilembe District Municipality. 
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4.2 An overview of the “Dolphin Coast” region 
4.2.1 Facts and figures 
The area of relevance for this project is effectively that which formed part of the 
demarcated zones for the former Borough of Dolphin Coast (BODC) transitional local 
authority in the immediate post-apartheid era.  The demarcated area, stretching along the 
coastal freeway between the Tongaat river in the south and Groutville in the north, 
includes settlements such as Ballito, Chaka’s Rock, Umhlali, Shakaskraal, Etete, 
Nkobongo, Shakashead, Tinley Manor and Sheffiled Beach (include reference to 
image/map in annexures).  At the time of its incorporation as a municipality it had an 
estimated population of 34 000 (WZC, 2003).  Today this population is estimated to be in 
the region of 45 000 (www.miiu.org.za/dolphin.html). 
 
The area, like much of South Africa, is characterised by extremes of wealth and poverty.  
Ballito and surrounds – the dominant formal settlement area – has over the years changed 
from a relatively small seasonal holiday town into an up-market commuter town for 
executives and professionals working closer to Durban.  During this shift the relatively 
small inland settlements, set aside for Indian residents in apartheid Group Areas planning, 
have witnessed the rapid growth of informal settlements on vacant land parcels and 
planned development of formal low cost housing (Maharaj, 2003).  The area within 
which the concession was demarcated includes largely formal urban dwellings, but does 
have elements which are formal and informal peri-urban and formal and informal rural. 
 
In order to understand the dynamics of the area, and to access relevant data, it is 
necessary to look at it in context of the Ilembe District Municipality, which today 
incorporates the area formerly known as the BODC.  Some key Ilembe facts and figures 
are included in the table below.  Where available, information on KwaDukuza, the local 
council which covers much of the old BODC area, has been included. 
 
Table 2.1 Basic data on Ilembe District 
Information category Ilembe District Municipality KwaDukuza Local Council 
Area (km2) 3260  
Population 560377 158586 (28% of IDM) 
Unemployment 39%  
Households with monthly 
income below R1500 
72% 62% 
% urban residents 14%  
% of population with access to 
“adequate” water supplies 
50%  
% of population without 
“adequate” access to 
sanitation 
75%  
Sources: www.ilembe.gov.za, Ilembe District Municipality IDP (2002) and Ilembe IDP Review (2003) – 
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Despite concentrations of residents in a number of urban settlements such as KwaDukuza 
(Stanger) and Mandeni the Ilembe population remains overwhelmingly rural or peri-
urban with rates of poverty and unemployment increasing in areas outside the major 
centres.  Nevertheless, the area does have a mix of economic activity which provides a 
basis for much on the income earned – in addition to income residents earn from working 
as commuters or migrants in the neighbouring eThekwini Municipal area or in coastal 
towns to the north.  Activities include commercial agriculture (mainly in the form of 
sugar cane growing and milling), tourism services related to coastal (but also some 
cultural and historical) attractions, large industry processing in the form of Sappi’s pulp 
mill and a range of industrial activities in the Mandeni and Stanger areas (drawn from 
Ilembe IDP, 2002). 
 
4.2.2 Development of local governance arrangements 
At the start of the PPP process which led to the contracting of the Siza Water Company 
the institution which initiated the processes was the Borough of Dolphin Coast – a 
transitional local authority – formed out of the post-1994 municipal restructuring 
processes.  The BODC took its name from the tourism marketing brand developed to 
package the coastal areas to the immediate north of Durban. 
“It was created in February 1995, out of a collection of eleven towns and 
settlements spread over an area of approximately 160 km2 …” (Maharaj, 
2003: p.222) 
The BODC, as an interim local government structure, fell away with the formation of 
new local government structures post the 2000 local government elections.  Thereafter, 
BODC was incorporated into the KwaDukuza Local Municipality.  This Municipality had 
not only a larger area of coverage but also three to four times the number of residents.  
However, institutional shifts did not end there.  During the course of 2003, the Ilembe 
District Municipality – which is the regional co-ordinating municipal body – responded 
to the Municipal Structures Amendment Act (2000) and subsequent Ministerial 
authorisations, which gave finality to municipal functions and powers, by taking over the 
function of a Water Services Authority and thereby responsibility for oversight of matters 
relating to regulatory and delivery functions as specified in the legislation.  It is for this 
reason that the IDM is today responsible for the concession. 
4.3 The evolution of SA policy on MSPs and WSS 
After the 1994 elections the Government determined that a radical overhaul was required 
of apartheid local government systems.  A host of different types of local authorities 
existed resulting in many hundreds of municipalities, health committees, town councils or 
related township administration structures existing side-by-side characterised by severe 
fragmentation within the approaches of local authorities themselves and between local 
authorities.  In order to enable democratic local elections to take place a set of interim 
local government arrangements were established which brought various types of local 
authorities under a handful of new municipal categories and initiated the process of 
integrating local governance institutions within newly defined transitional local authority 
areas.  The White Paper on Local Government produced in 1998 defined a further 
process of systems rationalisation and redefinition of roles and responsibilities which 
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culminated in the promulgation of new demarcations in line with the Municipal 
Structures (1998) and Municipal Systems Acts (2000). 
 
The combined effect of these processes was to create so-called wall-to-wall municipal 
government in the country.  In the case of the region in which the BODC was located this 
saw the creation of the Ilembe District Municipality with defined responsibilities and the 
demarcation of four local councils (including KwaDukuza) within its boundaries.  
Legislation referred to above required municipalities to restructure themselves in line 
with the new legislative requirements.  A key output of this was the development of 
district and local Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and procedural preascriptions for 
a full assessment of service delivery mechanisms required to fulfil the intent of the IDPs.  
For the first time an explicit case was made in policy and legislation for the formation of 
municipal service partnerships where deemed appropriate.  Key government role players 
co-operated in the formation of the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) to 
contribute to the facilitation of such service partnerships where appropriate. 
 
In terms of water and sanitation, government gave much attention to systems for their 
effective delivery as they were seen to be core to the basic needs package.  In this regard 
the Water Act of 1956 was deemed inappropriate for the circumstances of the time.  A 
process was initiated which resulted in the promulgation of the Water Services Act No 
108 of 1997.  This provided, 
“national legislation for the provision of water and sanitation services and 
set out the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government in 
achieving access to basic services.” (Ilembe District Municipality, 2003: 
p.1). 
Subsequent to this, government embarked on a process to define regulations under which 
frameworks for contracts between water service authorities and water service providers 
as defined within the Water Services Act (1997) would operate.  These processes began 
to give relatively specific guidelines under which a variety of water service delivery 
arrangements, ranging from public to fully privatised, could be considered (although, as 
will be discussed later, it should be noted that the Dolphin Coast concession was 
conceived and implemented before these regulations were finalised).  In the recent past, 
government has published a Strategic Framework for Water Services (Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry, 2003) with the intent that it provide further guidelines in the 
roll out of water-service related institutions and in the performance of their legislated 
responsibilities. 
 
Whilst much of the above outline highlights the issue of governance systems for effective 
water services delivery, there has also been the evolution of policy at a government level 
with regard to housing and free basic services which has had a fundamental impact on the 
actors in these processes.  In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the actual 
practise of managing local delivery and policy is also informed by initiatives such as the 
models used for the delivery of low income housing and the roll-out of free basic service 
provision.  Free basic service provision in particular has played an increasingly important 
role in discussions about the most effective systems for delivery of services such as water 
and sanitation to all households.  The impacts of these processes are fundamental as they 
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relate to matters of systems of service provision, engineering choices, viability and 
costing to name but a few factors. 
4.4 Stakeholder perspectives of the emerging policy framework 
Debates continue to rage in South Africa on the manner in which policy affecting 
municipal approaches to delivery of basic services has developed.  Some would argue, 
for example in articles produced by the Centre for Development and Enterprise, that slow 
progress has been made on key objectives because implementation frameworks have not 
yet fully embraced the potential of the private sector (Bernstein & Clynick, 2003, p11).  
Others, including those associated with the anti-privatisation lobby (such as MacDonald 
(2002)) make the case that the introduction of private sector-type arrangements in 
delivery services to the poor does little to reduce poverty.  These different perspectives 
are echoed to some degree by the various stakeholders interviewed for the project and in 
past work done on the concession.  However, for the bulk of the stakeholders interviewed 
their concerns are more with pragmatic realities of implementation in their context rather 
than with the “macro-level” debates. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to reflect on some of the opinions expressed by key 
groupings on the directions of national policy.  Firstly, with regard to labour (noting that 
the interview conducted was with a regional office bearer and not staff in the concession) 
there remains a considerable amount of scepticism about what is seen as the increasing 
role of the private sector in traditional municipal functions.  At a national level Cosatu 
has been outspoken about privatisation processes and takes the view that greater 
involvement of the private sector is neither good for the poor people that are the target for 
many policies and for the workers that have to implement them (www.cosatu.org.za).  In 
various submissions on evolving policy frameworks Cosatu and Samwu welcome 
increasing transparency and explicit shifts in orientation towards the needs of the poor.  
However, a case is made by these unions that government policy does not go far enough 
to guarantee a sufficient level of services for poor communities.  The unions take the 
view that the introduction of non-state service providers makes such attempts as there are 
to provide improved services to the poor unviable. 
“We have argued that we believe privatisation will be against the interests of 
the community, as well as against the interests of workers.  Water is a public 
good, and as such must be left in public hands.” (Cosatu and Samwu, 2003: 
p.16) 
 
Other stakeholders generally feel that policy is moving in the correct direction and that 
weaknesses and problems will be dealt with over time (Hultzer (SWC), Naidoo (IDM), 
Mbanjwa (IDM), Newton (IDM) interviews).  Problems identified include: 
• Endless and complex municipal restructuring has left many municipalities 
weakened; 
• National policy does not always take into account actual conditions on the 
ground; 
• Funding for municipal local government to implement basic service delivery is 
limited – the equitable share is insufficient; 
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• Programmes such as free basic water need dedicated funding and clarity as to 
exactly how they should be implemented; and 
• Improved clarity is needed on regulation within the sphere of MSPs and in terms 
of the actual services delivered. 
5. The WSS prior to the concession3 
This section discuses information available on the Dolphin Coast WSS prior to the 
concession and opinions of stakeholders related thereto.  
5.1 The water and sanitation service of the BODC 
Prior to the formation of the BODC in 1995, water and sanitation services in the area 
were managed by the Port-Natal Ebodwe Joint Services Board (JSB) and in some 
instances by Umgeni Water.  Umgeni Water is the regional water supply entity in the 
catchments supplying water to the Dolphin Coast area and has in many instances acted as 
bulk supplier and service provider.  The Port-Natal Ebodwe JSB was funded out of 
business levies and provided infrastructure investments in the greater Durban area – but 
largely outside the area that was under the former Durban City Council.  As it (the JSB) 
had been responsible for infrastructure services related to water and sanitation it also 
provided for the administration and management of the delivery of such services to 
customers in designated areas.  However, with the implementation of the first phase of 
transitional local government arrangements the JSB ceased to operate outside local 
government.  It was under these circumstances that the BDOC inherited water and 
sanitation systems that fell within its boundaries (with the exception of Umgeni Water 
infrastructure and assets for the supply of bulk water to the area). 
 
With the formal incorporation of the BODC in 1996, Umgeni Water provided assistance 
in provision of management relating to the water and sanitation services (Maharaj, 2003).  
However, projections in developmental growth (both in terms of high income and low 
income residents), combined with the very poor state of existing bulk infrastructure, 
presented the BODC with a growing investment and management responsibility that it 
felt could best be met through seeking an alternative model.4 
 
According to Hemson and Batidzirai (2002), in 1997 there were 3153 water meters in the 
BDOC area, yielding a monthly income of R250 000.  Monthly income from water 
services amounted to R271 000.  Net income had been increasing steadily at a low rate.  
Services in areas other than the areas to the east of the coastal free-way were limited and 
patchy.  Some areas such as Shakashead had no services, whilst other areas had 
standpipes or borehole systems.  The MIIU’s Dr James Leigland is quoted in Hemson 
                                                     
3
 Specific pre-concession indicators that are available are discussed in more detail in the section reviewing the 
implementation of the concession since 1999 (see Section 6). 
4
 It was estimated that upgrade and new service delivery requirements would cost the service R200m in 1997 prices. 
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: p18) 
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and Batidzirai (2002) as providing the following information on the pre-concession 
service: 
• 50% of the population lived in informal settlements and had inadequate services; 
• 22 staff were responsible for operations and maintenance (with Umgeni Water 
providing some technical and managerial support). 
 
Table 3.1 Summary table of pre-concession indicators 
Indicator Available information Comment 
Service coverage 50% of population in formal 
housing with 3153 homes with 
metered services 
 
Much uncertainty existed as to 
population size as situation 
was dynamic with new 
informal settlements post 1994 
Operational efficiency and 
quality of service 
Over 20% loss from original 
bulk purchase 
 
Limited information on service 
quality and efficiency was 
captured 
Prices and affordability For metered customers: 
R20 basic charge 
Volumetric charge of between 
R2,11 and R2,61 
Limited monitoring of 
boreholes and stand-pipes 
Affordability issues not fully 
tested with patchy service 
delivery to unserviced areas. 
Households in low-income 
housing projects with full 
service delivery struggling with 
paying of bills 
Finance and investment BODC struggling to reconcile 
borrowing obligations 
projected for service 
expansion and existing budget 
challenges 
BODC reached limits in terms 
of borrowing for new capital 
projects required to extend 
services 
Financial performance figures 
not showing net income 
growth to finance maintenance 
and service extension 
 
Labour issues 22 employees (excluding 
Umgeni Water staff) 
Lack of clarity and training and 
development prospects 
Umgeni Water provided 
technical and management 
services on an agency basis. 
Sources: WZC, 2003; Maharaj, 2003; Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002, Interviews 
5.2 Stakeholder perceptions of the pre-concession era 
Stakeholders expressed mixed views on the era before the concession.  This in part 
depended on the nature of the service being received.  On the more positive side there 
was a sense that the price structures were more reasonable (Ratepayers interview) and 
non-payment cut-offs were not as vigorously enforced (Dawood (IDM Councillor) 
interview).  However, there was appreciation that the combination of housing delivery 
and extension of services had brought an improved situation to areas that had been 
dominated by informal settlements before.  Ratepayers association members also allude 
to service problems such as those associated with low pressure, service interruptions and 
sewer over-flows.  On a more technical level a senior DWAF manager interviewed 
reflected on relatively high levels of water loss and periodic problems with waste-water 
quality.  With regard to employment matters it appears that pre-concession arrangements, 
whilst not without their problems, were generally on a par with equivalent municipalities 
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(Mathe (Samwu) interview).  Comments made by various municipal officials in other 
studies (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002, Maharaj, 2003) reveal that senior Dolphin Coast 
officials took the view that there were likely to be ongoing difficulties in delivering an 
effective service to the area if local government attempted to handle the function on its 
own.  Maharaj (2003) refers to comments by the former Town Clerk of BODC in making 
the point that, 
“No technical or management staff were transferred to the municipality, so 
[the] municipality did not have the experience to provide a comprehensive 
WSS service.  The bulk infrastructure in the geographically fragmented 
formal towns was in abject condition and service provision was generally 
inadequate. …Along with this, were the informal settlement areas, where 
50% of the population had virtually no services at all, and capital project 
investments were desperately required.” (Maharaj, 2003: p.226) 
6. Conception phase 
This section deals with the processes leading up to a decision to enter into a water and 
sanitation services PPP by the BODC.  It outlines preliminary discussions and processes 
and stakeholders perspectives.  The conception phase is important as it often sets the tone 
for stakeholder relations on the matter of MSPs through subsequent activities. 
6.1 The processes leading up to the concession decision 
As has been outlined in the discussion on the pre-concession service, municipal officials 
and political leadership reached the conclusion soon after the formation of the BODC that 
they had, at the time, neither the human nor the financial resources to adequately fulfil 
the function of water services provider in the area (former BODC Town Clerk referenced 
in Maharaj, 2003).  The “parcelling out” of the assets and systems of the former JSB to a 
variety of different municipal structures with differing levels of capacity did not ensure 
that knowledge systems, management and technical capacity and related economies of 
scale were available to the recipient structures (Newton (IDM) interview and Maharaj, 
2003).  The age of existing infrastructure (much of it beyond its engineering life) and the 
stress it was under with rapid population growth in the area added to these pressures 
(Hultzer (SWC) interview).5  Hence municipal authorities began a process of seeking 
advice and support on how to handle the matter of water and sanitation infrastructure and 
service delivery.6  These investigations culminated in a full examination of different 
service delivery options with the support and funding of the then Department of 
Constitutional Development (now Provincial and Local Government) and the Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry.  The Municipality, with the recommendation of its DBSA 
                                                     
5
 Maharaj (2003) quotes the municipal officials as saying the projected the population would grow to over 250 000 by 
2020. 
6
 Maharaj (2003) makes the case that a combination of cash flow problems caused by delays in government transfers 
for development projects and innovative leadership combined to lead the municipality to the point of examining 
alternative service delivery options.  A Councillor and the Ratepayers body also refer to a technical report on the 
state of services which was commissioned at the time which warned of significant and escalating investment 
required merely to maintain existing facilities (Dawood (IDM Councillor) and Ratepayers interviews). 
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(and later MIIU) advisors, placed public adverts stating its intention to seek to enter into a 
Municipal Service Partnership (MSP).  The DBSA and MIIU provided technical and 
advisory support to the Municipality throughout this process (Bassa (MIIU) interview).  
A councillor representing the area (Dawood (IDM Councillor) interview) and Maharaj 
(2003) both explained that efforts were made to equip senior BDOC officials and 
politicians to participate in choice making on MSPs.  This was through exposure to a 
series of information sessions and trips to other municipalities in South Africa and 
abroad. 
 
The Council discussions leading up to the issuing of a public notice caused considerable 
disquiet amongst labour from a variety of unions (Mbanjwa (IDM) interview).  The 
actual issuing of the public notice without full agreement being reached with unions 
aggravated tensions and resulted in demands for greater union-employer discussion on 
the matters.  At a community level, a number of forums were held in different residential 
areas to discuss the intended process.   
6.2 Stakeholder perspectives on this process 
Generally, the perception of stakeholders interviewed (supported by information gathered 
from other sources on the process) suggests that there was support at a political and 
administrative leadership level for the decision to examine a possible MSP for water and 
sanitation services.  This was reinforced by national policy dialogues on basic needs 
delivery and general municipal reform which proposed engagement of private sector 
capital and expertise where appropriate (Bassa (MIIU) interview and Maharaj, 2003).  At 
the time objections that were lodged came in the main from Cosatu-affiliated union 
structures.  The sections below outline perspectives on the immediate pre-concession 
phase as obtained from secondary sources and interviews conducted for the purposes of 
this report. 
 
6.2.1 Municipal officials 
Municipal officials active in the process at the time were of the view that they were 
making choices in the best interests of the people of the area (views referenced in 
Maharaj, 2003).  They also argue that every effort was made to involve stakeholders in 
the processes (Naidoo (IDM) interview).  The municipal officials dealing with the 
concessionaire today are generally of the view that, under the conditions of the time, the 
process that was followed was an appropriate one.  However, according to a senior 
Ilembe District Municipality official (previously active in the BODC and SWC), the 
move to call for expressions of interest for a MSP did begin to raise expectations of 
stakeholders that not only could the municipality get out of a tight spot, but it could also 
fast-track the delivery of a more extensive and better quality service (Mbanjwa (IDM) 
interview).  There was also a view expressed that not all stakeholders were sufficiently 
empowered to contribute to the processes. 
 
A number of the municipal officials interviewed made the point that the lack of certainty 
with regard to municipal restructuring should have been taken more into account during 
this period.  Whilst there was no national clarity on future structures and systems in the 
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mid 1990s, the fact that plans were being made for considerable institutional adjustments 
was widely known (Naidoo (IDM) interview).  In this regard, questions were asked as to 
what extent the decision to proceed could not have been delayed whilst relevant policies 
were finalised. 
 
6.2.2 Councillors and community 
A Councillor involved in the process made the point that, 
“There was substantial resistance to the concession as it was labelled as 
privatisation by the unions.  The issue was also resisted by the community as 
there was a concern that prices would increase when water was sold for 
profit.  There was also the perception from the community that a company 
would be more efficient and hard-line in implementing cut-offs for non-
payment.  Discussion was held with unions and at some point Bonnie 
Maharaj [ANC Councillor and Deputy Mayor at the time] met with Sam 
Shilowa [then Cosatu President] in an attempt to avert a dispute. …. 
Tensions developed as the local workers were supportive but the national 
players opposed the move.”7 (Dawood (IDM Councillor) interview) 
A case was also made by the Councillor that more effort to build capacity of community 
role-players could have been made.  This is reinforced by community members quoted in 
the Hemson Batidzirai study (2002): 
“At first we were told about Umgeni Water; thereafter we were told Umgeni 
had bad quality water which is not all right for us.  There was not enough 
consultation and we could not forsee the problems we are experiencing now.” 




As has already been stated, Cosatu affiliated unions were generally sceptical of the 
proposals.  A member of the Cosatu-affiliated South African Municipal Workers Union 
(Samwu) suggested in an interview that in many cases decisions have already been taken 
to proceed with some form of private service delivery when public notices are issued and 
inadequate preparatory discussions are undertaken with stakeholders (Mathe (Samwu) 
interview).  The interviewee also made the point that preliminary processes are often off 
the record and not transparent (Mathe (Samwu) interview).  This is reinforced in Maharaj 
(2003) where reference is made to Municipal leadership acknowledging that unions 
remained unhappy with the decision to seek MSP options.  More recently a Cosatu and 
Samwu paper on the White Paper on Water Services has said in no uncertain terms, 
“We don’t believe it can be in the public interest to give a 30-year contract to 
a private company to deliver services as they have done in places like 
                                                     
7
 In the interview with Mathe (Samwu KZN), the point was made that workers were attracted by the “short-sighted” 
option of cashing in their pensions at the same time as being guaranteed continued employment.  This choice made 
them less sympathetic to the principled position of the national union movement.  Hemson and Batidzirai (2002) 
outline how unions other than Samwu did not express much opposition in principled terms to the process but focused 
on securing worker benefits in the process.  However, Mathe (Samwu) (interview) claims that had Samwu not voiced 
such objection to the process it is likely that such significant levels of worker protection would not have been won. 
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Nelspruit and Dolphin Coast.  Evidence has been steadily mounting of 
numerous problems with public-private partnerships and privatisation 
initiatives.” (Cosatu and Samwu, 2003, p.16) 
 
In specific terms issues raised by the workers directly concerned with the process 
included: 
• Job security 
• Conditions of service 
• Uncertainty and lack of trust 
The latter issue was particularly important as it was unclear what the precise outcome of 
the concession process would be and who would be the new employer entity that they 
would be dealing with.  The fact that some unions took principled stands against what 
was described as privatisation also increased levels of concern amongst workers.  
Without any real examples of such concessions to look at in South Africa staff felt to 
some degree dis-empowered in the process (Mathe (Samwu) and Mbanjwa (IDM) 
interviews). 
 
6.2.4 Concessionaire management 
In terms of the framework of this report, the experience of SWC as a potential interested 
party is primarily reflected in the report section covering the contract phase as they only 
became actively involved from the time of the issuing of the call for expressions of 
interest (deemed to be step one of the contracting process in this exercise).  However, in 
terms of SWC’s major shareholder – Saur Services – the view expressed from 
comparative experiences was that circumstances and processes leading up to PPP 
decisions differ markedly from place to place (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  The point was 
also made, that in comparative terms, it appeared that levels of consultation and 
discussions were more extensive than in many other circumstances. 
 
6.2.5 Concluding comments on perspectives of conception phase 
It is important to reflect that a significant number of those interviewed made the point 
that they did not feel there were other viable alternatives to seeking partnerships.  Hence 
the decision taken was not necessarily founded on a view by all stakeholders that 
partnerships would guarantee improved sustained performance in service delivery (Mathe 
(Samwu), Dawood (IDM Councillor) and Ratepayers Association interviews).  It is also 
clear that on reflection there were differing expectations of what would constitute 
sufficient and effective consultation with stakeholders. 
 
7. Contract phase 
This section of the report examines the contracting process from the issuing of a public 
notice to the contract coming into effect.  Considering the lack of experience of the 
domestic partners in the process with regard to PPPs and their limited track record in the 
country the contract was to be a learning experience but at the same time had to lay the 
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foundations for a thirty year relationship that would meet the objectives of various 
parties. 
7.1 The call for proposals and decision making processes 
In summary terms the steps leading up to the contract were as follows (adapted from 
Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002; Hultzer (SWC) interview): 
• BODC inherited WSS (March 1996) 
• BODC decides to seek WSS partnership and approaches DBSA for assistance 
(November 1996) 
• Public notice of intention to seek MSP options for WSS (including call for 
expressions of interest) followed by shortlisting of prospective bidders and 
preparation of RFP (late 1996) 
• Request for Proposals issued to four shortlisted entities (February 1997) 
• SWC selected as preferred bidder – contract negotiations entered into (November 
1997) 
• Concession contract signed (January 1999) 
• SWC commences operations (April 1999) 
 
The formal contract phase can be seen to have been initiated with the Request for 
proposals (RFP) prepared with the assistance of the DBSA in February 1997.  This 
provided interested parties with information on the present service system and projections 
for new projects in the pipeline (eg low income housing) as well as a terms of reference 
outlining the sort of services that would be expected and possible terms under which such 
services could be considered (Maharaj, 2003 and WZC, 2003).  Explicit conditions 
relating to labour were outlined in this documentation in an effort to assuage concerns of 
unions.  The preparation of the RFP was done in parallel to shortlisting of those entities 
that had submitted expressions of interest previously.  Of the fifteen expressions of 
interest received, five (four with foreign partners) were requested to respond to the RFP 
documentation (Maharaj, 2003).8  The submissions from the entities were evaluated by a 
technical panel of municipal officials and supported by expert advisors appointed through 
the DBSA.  This panel made its recommendations to the executive political structure of 
the BDOC which in turn authorised officials to proceed with negotiations with the 
preferred bidder in the form of Siza Water Company.9 
 
Bids were evaluated on a range of factors.  These included the capabilities and experience 
of the consortiums and consortium partners, technical operational responses, detailed 
financial projections relating to investment and pricing and company structure (including 
                                                     
8
 The bidders included participation by Umgeni Water (initially disallowed, but later included after it was clarified that 
the bid was through a wholly-owned subsidiary and not Umgeni Water as the bulk utility), SAUR (a French 
subsidiary of the Bouyges Group – in part owned by France’s state-owned national electricity company), Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux (also French), Vivendi (French) and Thames Water (English). 
9
 SWC is an amalgam of five companies: SAUR Services Limited (58%), Metropolitan Life (23%), Investment 
Progress Holdings (5% - empowerment partner), NANO Investments (5% - empowerment Partner), WDB 
Investment Holdings (5% - empowerment partner). 
Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 17 
 
matters of black economic empowerment) (WZC, 2003 and Mbanjwa (IDM) interview).  
Maharaj (2003) quotes the former BODC Town Clerk, Town Secretary and Deputy 
Mayor as outlining the key benefits of SAUR’s (SWC’s) selection in the following 
manner: 
• It would source foreign direct investment; 
• SAUR would be able to apply its specialist WSS knowledge to improve services 
and efficiencies; 
• SAUR’s size would enable it to achieve economies of scale through alignment 
with other operations; 
• SAUR’s information technology and software was attractive; 
• SAUR had a black economic empowerment partner; and 
• SAUR had a community social upliftment clause in its bid. 
 
Through this process the role of the MIIU (and the DBSA) should be highlighted.  
Maharaj (2003) states that senior municipal officials believed it necessary that external 
support to the process be sought to ensure adequate information was available to make 
decisions.  The MIIU had been established to assist municipalities in public private 
partnerships.  Grant funding from the MIIU and Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, amounting in total to R2,4m, was made available for technical support for the 
contracting process (Maharaj, 2003). 
7.2 The contract10 
The contract was drafted by the parties (BODC and its advisors and SWC) during 
protracted negotiations (Masefield (DWAF) interview).  It provided for a 30 year 
arrangement and drew extensively from similar contracts elsewhere (Bassa (MIIU) 
interview).  Section 5.1 of the original agreement (Appointment of Concessionaire) 
states: 
“5.1.1. Subject to the terms and conditions of the Contract, the COUNCIL 
hereby grants to the CONCESSIONAIRE, the following exclusive 
right and authority during the term of this Contract to: 
5.1.1.1. process, use, manage, operate, occupy, and have free and 
unencumbered access to the Works; 
5.1.1.2. redesign, upgrade and expand the Works; 
5.1.1.3. supply the Water Services directly to Customers; 
5.1.1.4. charge each Customer directly for the supply of Water Services and 
to apply all monies so collected as it deems fit; and 
5.1.1.5. save as otherwise stated in this Contract, operate within the 
Concession Area as a private sector water services provider 
pursuant to the Water Services Act. 
                                                     
10
 This section refers, in the main, to the original contract of 1999, this was subsequently adjusted through a 
supplementary agreement drafted in late 2001.  Relevant aspects of the supplementary agreement are discussed in the 
chapter on implementation. 
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and in each case to do such other things which are 
necessarily incidental thereto.” (Dolphin Coast and SWC 
Concession agreement, 1999) 
 
The contract is drafted along the lines of many commercial contracts, although it includes 
a number of specific aspects of relevance to WSS concessions.  Much detail is covered in 
the contract with regard to matters of the rights of various parties in relation to existing 
and new assets.  For instance the contract specifies that all existing assets at the start of 
the concession are to be transferred in full back to the Municipality at the end of the 
concession.  Any new capital and operating assets are to be offered to the Municipality in 
advance of disposal and that disposal of assets in the last years of the concession is to be 
done only with the express approval of the Municipality.  Such clauses are common place 
in concessions where specific obligations are carried by the concessionaire relating to 
commissioning party’s assets and where management of the concession requires 
investment in upgrading or acquiring new assets. 
 
The report also specifies technical standards, the basis of tariff formulation and processes 
related thereto and covers issues relating to personnel.  In this context SWC committed to 
specific requirements around conditions of employment, staff development, to the 
creation of a Youth and Community development Fund and to further empowerment 
(employing local labour, contracting to local (especially disadvantaged) firms and 
procuring from small and local enterprises.  Further sections of the agreement require the 
concessionaire to provide performance guarantees and insurance and to provide regular 
information and reports to the Municipality with regard to a host of performance issues.  
The agreement concludes with details on the liability of various parties and specifies 
terms under which the contract could be terminated or extended. 
 
The following sections of the document provides a summary of how the agreement 
handled issues core to this study. 
 
7.2.1 Tariffs 
According to Section 40 of the concession agreement, 
“The determination, amendment and approval of all Tariffs shall be 
undertaken by the COUNCIL in accordance to all prevailing Regulatory 
Provisions and the provisions of this contract.” (Dolphin Coast - Siza Water 
Company, 1999: p.59) 
These tariffs were to be reflected in a negotiated tariff schedule which was attached to the 
agreement for the first year of operations.  The agreement specifies that the tariff should 
include, 
“a lifeline tariff for a quantity of at least 6 (six) kl per Customer per month 
for a basic water service”. (ibid, 1999, p.58) 
The agreement also sets out terms in which either party can call for a tariff review 
(Annexure E2 of the agreement): under the terms there are annual reviews, five year 
reviews and the potential for extra-ordinary reviews.  The Council is empowered to reject 
calls for an extra-ordinary review if it deems the request to be linked in any way to under 
performance of the concessionaire. 




The agreement makes provision under section 46 for the transfer of an agreed11 list of 
personnel under conditions which would secure their existing terms and conditions (with 
the exception of pension arrangements as it was not possible for the Municipality to 
secure amendments to Municipal pension rules to allow for continued participation by 
non-municipal employees).  Limitations placed on the concessionaire with regard to 
employee matters include: 
• Agreeing not to terminate employment of any employee based on operational 
requirements (ie no downsizing) resulting from the contract; 
• Allowing for continued rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining; 
• Reaffirming commitment to relevant labour legislation; 
• Agreeing to negotiate new benefit arrangements at same or improved levels; 
• Agreeing to implement a training programme costing in the region of at least 
three percent of wage bill; 
• Implementation of affirmative action. 
The contract also specifies the requirement for the concessionaire to set up a social fund 
to assist employees in financial difficulty due to circumstances beyond their control. 
 
7.2.3 Water services delivery 
Part D of the agreement goes into considerable detail in setting performance parameters 
for the actual service in terms of systems and standards.  Annexure B3 of the agreement 
provides specific technical standards to be enforced – that can be revised as the 
concession progresses.  In this regard standards of delivery and maintenance must meet 
approved levels.  This part of the agreement also specifies conditions under which the 
concessionaire can cut-off services (in terms of an agreed procedure in Annexure B4).  
The conditions include: 
• Illegal connections (ie those not authorised by the concessionaire); 
• Delays in payment (according to terms of Annexure B4) 
Annexure B4 covers a range of customer service issues and ties the concessionaire down 
to specific (if perhaps rather generous) commitments.  For instance, the agreement 
specifies faulty meters must be replaced within 180 days of being reported, written 
complaints must be responded to within 10 days and account queries must be handled 
within 20 days of notification. 
 
7.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
The contract sets out obligations for both concessionaire and Municipality with regard to 
monitoring and evaluation.  The concessionaire is obliged under Part H to collect 
specified information about its finances, its operations and its performance and to provide 
this information to the Municipality as requested and in terms of regular reports.  The 
Council, in Part I agrees to manage its regulatory role in such a manner that does not 
                                                     
11
 Agreed on the basis of negotiation between the parties, based on prior agreement with union officials. 
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hinder the effective operations of the concession through delays etc.  Section 62.7 of the 
contract states that, 
“The COUNCIL shall co-operate with the CONCESSIONAIRE to facilitate 
implementation of the Contract and in exercising its powers of monitoring, 
inspection and regulation in a reasonable manner having regard to especially 
the rights and interests of Customers.” (ibid, p.94) 
It was understood by both parties in terms of the agreement that the stipulated concession 
fee amount would cover costs of Council building up capacity to undertake effective 
monitoring and evaluation in the future. 
 
7.2.5 Finance and investment 
The contract specifies terms under which the concessionaire will manage Council assets, 
including rental arrangements where appropriate.  It also specifies ownership conditions 
of stand alone new capital investments made during the concession period (they will vest 
with the concessionaire) and of improvements to existing facilities (which revert to the 
Municipality at the end of the concession period unless agreed otherwise).  Annexure B1 
of the agreement outlines negotiated concession fees, payments etc.  The original contract 
specified a first year fee of R554 850 and indicated that this would escalate in line with 
CPI for the first five years of the agreement.  Future concession fee arrangements would 
be negotiated in terms of future five year plans.  In addition to the fee, the agreement 
specifies a performance guarantee and maintenance bond aimed at protecting the interests 
of the Municipality should the concessionaire fail under specified circumstances to meet 
the requirements of the agreement. 
 
7.2.6 Other 
The agreement also covers matters such as the setting up of a youth development fund 
and empowerment procedures with respect of working with small contractors.  In 
governance and participation terms there is very little specified in the contract.  Clearly 
the concessionaire needs to account for its activities to the Municipality.  However, the 
specifics of how this should work, whom should be involved and to what degree such 
information should be public is not clear.  There is also no specific provision for 
customer consultation in any defined manner on core issues of performance, nature of 
service, tariffs etc. 
7.3 Stakeholder perspectives on the contract phase 
7.3.1 Municipal officials 
Council officials indicated that there was general satisfaction with the formulation of the 
contract, but conceded that, in hindsight, greater effort could have been invested in 
testing information that formed the basis of the contract.  The fact that the concession 
survived later crises was testament, not only to the maturity of stakeholders, but also of 
the solidity of the contract (Naidoo (IDM) interview).  A word of caution was sounded in 
that much still depends on successfully negotiating each five year arrangement as the 
concession progresses.  The contract will be further tested by policy and institutional 
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change and further supplementary agreements should not be ruled out.  According to one 
official, contracts should be viewed as living documents and not cast in stone for eternity 
(Newton (IDM) interview). 
7.3.2 Councillors and community 
Community representatives in the form of Ratepayers Association members indicated 
that they had little direct insight into the contract and felt both excluded and 
disempowered despite efforts that were made to report on progress at public meetings.  
Community members quoted in Maharaj (2003) and Hemson and Batidzirai (2002) 
echoed the sentiment that there was insufficient consultation in the processes and were 
generally not in a position to comment on specific elements of the contract.  A ward 
councillor who had been active in Council committees dealing with the concession made 
the point that the contract could have been based on improved viability information 
(related to growth estimates) and should have introduced alternative charging systems for 
sewer services other than the volumetric system (Dawood (IDM Councillor) interview).  
The councillor also makes the point that much of the focus of discussions around the 
contract was on unions and that community structures were less effectively included – it 
was expected that they would participate through political representatives. 
7.3.3 Labour 
Labour, in the form of national structures Samwu and Cosatu reacted most strongly to the 
signing of the contract.  In a press statement issues shortly after the concession agreement 
was made public a Cosatu statement was issued which read, 
“Cosatu is shocked and disappointed to be notified that the Minister of Local 
Government and Constitutional Affairs, Vali Moosa, last week gave a go-
ahead for the privatisation of water delivery on the KwaZulu-Natal’s Dolphin 
Coast” (Cosatu, 1999) 
The Union went on to accuse government parties of behaving in bad faith – by arguing 
that agreed procedures had not been followed in seeking approval for the concession 
from tri-partite negotiation forums at a national level.  However, despite maintaining this 
objection to deal on the basis of a principled “anti-privatisation” stance, union officials 
concede that the contract provided comprehensive protection for workers transferred 
(Mathe (Samwu) interview).  A point of concern was raised about transfer of pensions 
where existing municipal pension fund rules did not allow for the continued membership 
of people not in the employ of local government and where workers generally took the 
option of cashing in pension benefits to use for consumption needs at the time leaving 
them without pension protection they had built up over time (Mathe (Samwu) interview). 
7.3.4 Concessionaire management 
Management of SWC expressed similar views to those of the Council officials in respect 
of the contract and related processes.  They feel the contract lives up to international best 
practise and has stood the test of time (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  It was also conceded 
by the SWC official that stakeholder buy-in could have been more actively sought and 
that external reviews of the contract by neutral parties could have been of benefit, 
especially considering the crisis the concession experienced in its early period of 
operations relating to rising interest rates and development falling short of projections. 
Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 22 
 
7.3.5 Concluding comments on the perspectives of stakeholders on the contract 
phase 
Stakeholders directly involved in the contract negotiations have, despite the crisis that led 
to a supplementary agreement being signed, suggested that the contracting process was 
generally sound.  Drawing from Hemson and Batidzirai (2002) and interviews it can be 
seen that labour, in the form of Cosatu affiliated unions, took both a strategic and 
pragmatic perspective.  On the one hand the process, and more especially its conclusion, 
was not supported in line with Cosatu’s anti-privatisation stance.  However, shop 
stewards and regional organisers active at the local level participated directly and actively 
in the processes to secure an improved outcome for the workers understanding that 
pragmatic engagement had to operate side-by-side with national positions of principle.  
Both SWC management and Council officials interviewed expressed the view that had 
unions not participated it would have substantially destabilised the process.  
Nevertheless, stakeholders having the benefit of the hindsight point out that flaws in the 
originating documentation underlying the contract contributed substantially to the 
problems the concession encountered in 2001.  Rate payer structures suggested that this 
could have been the result of a lack of transparency in contracting discussions and 
processes (rate payers interview).  Others suggest that the fact that the concession 
survived the crisis is testament to the solid nature of the original contract (Hultzer (SWC) 
and Naidoo (IDM) interviews).  An official of the MIIU reflected that building 
stakeholder capacity for stakeholder engagement with contract discussions was critical 
and that perhaps there would be value in having some of the originating studies subjected 
to reviews before contracts were finalised (Bassa (MIIU) interview). 
8. Implementation phase 
The concession has been in operation since agreements were signed in January 1999.  
This section examines the operational performance in relation to contract obligations and 
available information on pre-concession arrangements and reports on stakeholder 
perceptions of a variety of issues relating to WSS delivery within the concession area.  In 
terms of this report the following categories of relevance to the stakeholders have been 
selected for examination from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, where 
information allows: 
• Extent of and type of service coverage 
• Quality of service and product 
• Pricing and affordability 
• Employment and labour relations 
• Financial performance and investment 
 
The report will also look specifically at monitoring and evaluation as well as governance 
aspects in that these have emerged as central in the concession experience in the Dolphin 
Coast.  However, before proceeding to look at these specific matters some background 
information is provided below on SWC’s approach to meeting their obligations and how 
this approach has evolved over time. 
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8.1 SWC’s approach to water and sanitation services12 
According to Siza Water’s Customer Services Manager (Hultzer (SWC) interview) a 
range of factors influence SWCs approach to delivery of WSS services in the concession 
area: 
• Contractual obligations to the Municipality 
• The inherited infrastructure, systems and delivery arrangements 
• Performance in relation to shareholder expectations (delivering profit and 
reinforcing status of SAUR as a leader in the sector) 
• The interests of the Municipality and its customers 
• SWC’s eagerness to build a reputation as a good service provider 
 
Clearly, the contractual obligations are paramount as they define the essence of what a 
concession is about and should ideally reflect other relevant factors.  In this regard, the 
negotiations which resulted in the deal being concluded involved extensive discussions 
on SWC’s approach and its obligations.  There was consensus in the discussions that a 
number of key priorities needed to be addressed in the first five year programme of the 
concession.  The most pressing of these identified by SWC (and built into their approach 
were): 
• Upgrading and rehabilitating infrastructure to deliver an effective service to 
existing customers (within allowable budgets) 
• Extending services to un-serviced communities and those in new developments 
programmed for delivery in the first five years of the concession 
• Introducing new management, information technology and customer services 
arrangements 
• Reducing inefficiencies, waste and water loss (Hultzer (SWC) interview) 
 
As is common along much of South Africa’s coastline, the wealthier (mostly white) 
customers reside in close proximity to the sea whilst poorer (mostly black) residents live 
in a variety of settlement types scattered along inland transport routes.  SWC noted that 
systems in place, based largely on previous apartheid development approaches, enabled 
wealthy white customers (in eastern areas) to have (in most cases) full service metered 
water delivery with water-borne sanitation.  This was specified as a level 4 service by 
SWC and a set of water and sewer tariffs were set by the Municipality in the agreement 
(in negotiation with SWC) to enable more effective cost recovery as well as allowing for 
a measure of income coverage for SWC in relation to risks they perceived in delivery of 
services to western area customers that were largely serviced with stand-pipe 
arrangements and did not have access to water-borne sanitation.  This was specified by 
SWC as a level 2 service.13  A different set of tariffs were approved by the Municipality 
for this set of customers.  It should be noted that a considerable number of households in 
the western area did receive a level 4 service, but in many areas (as will be discussed 
                                                     
12
 See service differentiation information on concession map in annexure. 
13
 The Municipality in partnership with Provincial Housing uses grant funding from central Government to provide 
basic infrastructure in low income township establishment processes – SWC then becomes responsible for the 
ongoing operation and maintenance of these services (Mbanjwa (IDM) interview). 
Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 24 
 
later) this was not sustained and households reverted to a level 2 service when 
affordability constraints made level 4 payments unviable.  The table below summarises 
some of the characteristics related to the two service options in broad terms. 
 
Table 6.1 Service delivery options table 
Category Level 2 (largely west) Level 4 (largely east) 
Household characteristics Low cost housing unit or 
informal unit 
Formal family or holiday home 
Basic water service package Water drawn from community 
stand-pipe 
Individual metered household 
connection 
Use monitoring system Pre-payment meters at stand-
pipes 
Site meters 
Payment Pre-payment14 Post-consumption billing 
Basic sanitation package VIP15 Water-borne sanitation 
Sanitation charge system None Volumetric change (based on 
proportion of water consumed) 
Original developer Provincial subsidy housing or 
individuals 
Private sector or individuals 
Basic site-related 
infrastructure costs paid by … 
State through housing subsidy 
and national government 
grants 
At expense of developer 
 
SWC make the case (Hultzer (SWC) interview) that they do whatever they can to 
upgrade delivery and services within the affordability limits imposed through tariffs 
agreed to by the Municipality.  However, 90% of the concession income is generated off 
the bulk of the level 4 customers in Ballito (Hulzer (SWC) interview).  Clearly upper-
income households operate on a higher consumption pattern and as consumption 
increases so do charges.  It could therefore be argued that customers that fall into this 
bracket are more attractive to the concessionaire as service margins are better.  This in 
turn places some stress on customer service to areas where revenue income is low and is 
an issue SWC admitted they continue to struggle with on a day-to-day basis. 
 
8.2 Implementation performance indicators: Quantitative measures 
and qualitative assessments 
This section looks at performance of the concessionaire in relation to contractual 
obligations and the performance of the previous operator.  It aims to track available 
comparable data, discuss some technical aspects of performance and record stakeholder 
perspectives. 
 
8.2.1 Extent and type of service coverage 
Before getting into a detailed discussion of service coverage, it should be taken into 
account that both the present and former municipal structures have struggled to get an 
                                                     
14
 Introduced in 2001. 
15
 Although those households that did originally receive water-borne sanitation connections are able to still utilise 
system provided they collect the water and it is not blocked through lack of water throughput. 
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accurate sense of population size.  A variety of reports examined and respondents 
interviewed suggested data obtained from official sources was not accurate (WZC, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2003; Hultzer (SWC), Naidoo (IDM), Newton (IDM) interviews).  SWC is at 
present working on the basis of an estimated population in the region of 34 000 for the 
concession area (the original RFP placed estimates in 1997 at 34 645 but there seems to 
be some consensus that this was a bit on the high side).  Nevertheless, despite these 
uncertainties with regard to base figures, an external review of the achievement against 
targets of the SWC noted that, 
“The contract specified a number of operational and maintenance 
requirements that Siza had to fulfil.  These were studied and the consultants 
are satisfied that Siza has implemented measures to deal all of them them.” 
(WZC, 2003: p.24) 
 
The parameters for service delivery options and targets to be met (particularly with 
respect to the first five years of the concession) specified in contract documentation are 
key to assessing progress made in service coverage.  The table below (interpreted from 
WZC, 2003) summarises, in broad terms, the commitments made and related 
achievements.  It should be noted that the agreed five year period runs until 2005. 
 
Table 6.2 Five year performance targets (service coverage)  
Area WSS percentage coverage targets Achievement 
Eastern coastal zone 
(Ballito, Salt Rock etc) 
100% level 4 service by year 5 
Septic tank areas - Existing septic 
tanks to be reticulated when situation 
demands 
Achieved – focus on planning 
for next five year period (new 
residential and commercial 
growth) 
Shakaskraal 100% level 4 service by year 5 (90% 
for sanitation) 
Achieved 
Umhlali (Foxhill and 
Taffeni) 
100 % level 4 service by year 5 
Existing septic tanks to be reticulated 
when situation demands 
Largely achieved 
Shakashead 200 sites level 2 services and 250 
sites with level 4 service by year 5 
Upgrading of level 2 service to 
effective level 4 service on customer 
demand 
393 level 2 sites and 130 level 
4 sites 
Nkobongo 1362 sites to be provided level 2 
service by year 5 
Upgrading of level 2 service to level 4 
service on customer demand 
Progress on programme 
Etete 1749 sites to be provided level 2 
service and 1200 sites with level 4 
service by year 5 
Upgrading of level 2 service to level 4 
service on customer demand 
514 level 2 sites completed 
Source: derived from WZC, 2003 
 
SWC figures, as quoted by WZC (2003), show that in April 2001 there were 9501 units 
(customers) serviced through either level 2 or level 4 arrangements.  By April 2002 this 
had increased to 9902.  In the early period of the concession the focus remained that of 
attempting to deliver sustainable level 4 services to as many households as possible.  But 
with increasing failure of households to cope with costs associated with this, many of 
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them switched to using standpipe water and water-borne sanitation systems became 
unusable (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  On this basis in 2000 and 2001 SWC, in 
consultation with Council authorities, shifted to working with the level 2 provision that 
was standard to low income housing projects and took a greater role in delivery of 
additional standpipes along with, at the start of 2001, pre-payment meters.  WZC (2003) 
quotes an increase in standpipes servicing Nkobongo of 43 during this period (from 7 to 
50).  In this model residents are able to upgrade to level 4, if their circumstances allow, as 
infrastructure is in place.  However, officials of IDM and SWC indicated that there is 
very little upgrading taking place as communities remain economically depressed 
(Hultzer (SWC) and Mbanjwa (IDM) interviews). 
 
Both the shift from level 4 provision to level 2 provision and the use of pre-payment 
meters has not been without controversy and difficulty.  Maharaj (2003) documents 
frustration in communities at receiving a lower level of service than they expected.  
These adjustments should not been seen separately from the difficulties the 
concessionaire encountered in 2001 when a substantial adjustment to the contract had to 
be negotiated including reducing investment commitments and increasing tariff levels.  
However, despite the problems encountered, in broad terms, a case can be made that 
delivery is on track in terms of approved commitments. 
 
8.2.2 Quality of service and product 
A range of measures are available to assess matters of quality.  For the purposes of this 
document the focus will be on the technical measures of what would constitute an 
effective operation (water loss, product standards, breakdowns) and customer complaints.  
It is important to note here that the very limited monitoring systems of the operations 
prior to the concession and a lack of accessible records make pre-concession comparisons 
difficult.  According to SWC staff it took most of their first year to establish effective 
measures to really reflect accurately on the state of the service.  As it a took a period of 
time before SWC was able to effectively intervene to improve services, early readings 
could be seen as a reflection of the state of the service prior to the concession.  Table 
JJGC (below) summarises some of the key performance measures over time (drawn from 
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2000/2001 2001/2002 Latest results 
Water loss as % of 
bulk purchase 




 89 97 100 
Chemical quality 
(% conformity to 
standards) 
 98 100 100 
Total bursts (no of 
incidents) 
Not recorded 144 188 161 
Total leaks (no of 
incidents) 
Not recorded 188 94 53 




Not recorded 297 752 857 
Customer 
complaints17 
(Target = ave of 15 
per month) 
Not recorded 32 26 30 
Days to respond to 
complaints (ave 
per complaint) 
Not recorded 9.7 5 13 
Sources: WZC, 2003; SWC monthly reports, Sept 2003; Maharaj, 2003 
 
With regard to technical performance measures SWC is generally making progress to 
improve its efficiency and to ensure its systems run effectively.  However, despite a 
considerable investment programme to replace old pipes and re-engineer poorly designed 
sewer systems, problems have not been entirely dealt with.  A far more active 
maintenance programme has thus been introduced which has meant far more problems 
are picked up on a regular basis and SWC management maintain that they are finally 
making inroads into breakdown reductions resulting from poor historic maintenance and 
investment (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  With regard to water quality and water loss 
measures, SWC now operates within accepted global norms and consistently so – an 
improvement on performance of the service before (Dawood (IDM Councillor) and 
Ratepayer interviews).  The figures below, taken from SWC’s internal reporting system, 







                                                     
16
 SWC admitted to WZC (2003) that figures are generally worse in western areas of Nkobongo, Shakashead and Etete. 
17
 The most common complaints are those related to: (1) Sewerage overflow, (2) No water, and (3) Pressure queries 
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Figure 6.1 Cumulative efficiency ratio over time (July 2002 – September 2003) 
























































Source: SWC Monthly report (Sept 2003) 
 
Figure 6.2 Water sales as a % of water purchased (July 2002 – August 2003) 









Source: SWC Monthly report (Sept 2003) 
 
With regard to customer service matters, efforts have been made by SWC to introduce 
effective systems and to meet requirements as per the contract.  Generally SWC’s 
response times to complaints, queries and requests for new services are in line with 
planned levels.  However, they do concede that there remains a challenge to secure 
ongoing customer service improvements in townships (WZC, 2003).  For example, some 
standpipe areas had poor quality pre-payment meters installed and it has taken time to 
effect the replacement of these as revenue becomes available (Hultzer (SWC), interview). 
 
Stakeholder perceptions of the quality of the service are generally positive.  A number of 
those interviewed made the point that initial teething problems appear to have been sorted 
out and noticeable improvements continue to take place (Dawood (IDM Councillor), 
Mbanjwa (IDM), Ratepayers interviews).  Faulty meters, incorrect billing and burst and 
blocked pipes were raised as some of the most pressing issues (Dawood (IDM 
Councillor) and Ratepayers interviews).   
 
Research done into customer perceptions in areas such as Nkobongo, Etete and 
Shakashead suggests that there remains considerable disquiet about the lack of affordable 
options related to on site water and water-borne sanitation as well as the pre-payment 
meter system (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).  In this sense it would be difficult to make a 
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case that people are happy with the level 2 service arrangements as expectations exist of a 
higher level of service. 
 
8.2.3 Pricing and affordability 
Pricing and affordability issues are foremost in the minds of many stakeholders when it 
comes to municipal services.  Government policy has paid much attention to these 
matters and much of this effort has been directed at water services since failure to provide 
safe water to the bulk of South Africans was one of the more destructive consequences of 
apartheid policy.  The issue of pricing and affordability has attracted additional attention 
within the SWC arrangement due to the fact that the concession entered a crisis phase in 
late 2001 when the concessionaire indicated it was unable to meet its obligations to the 
Municipality (KwaDukuza at the time) in terms of lease payments which formed a part of 
the original contract.  The outcome of this crisis was a supplementary agreement to the 
original contract which adjusted the obligations of SWC under the contract and also led 
to the Municipality agreeing to an adjustment of tariffs.  This aggravated consumer 
concerns.  Level 4 customers, who were already unhappy with volume-based sewer 
charges that had under pre-concession arrangements been incorporated at a much lower 
rate into general rates collection, were particularly vociferous in their concerns 
(Ratepayers interview). 
 
The crisis could be attributed to a number of factors.  These included: 
 
• A financial crisis at Umgeni Water (the bulk supplier) related to governance 
problems and debt incurred from rural water schemes which resulted in the utility 
imposing a price increase of over 20% on all its customers (water service 
providers had been planning on increase figures closer to inflation levels).  SWC, 
and other service providers, had no choice but to pass the bulk of these increases 
onto customers. 
 
• Projected development growth of level 4 customers in greater Ballito/Zimbali area 
did not take place due to weak economic conditions in the country and high 
interest rates discouraging construction.  This rendered the original Bosch and 
Associates projections, incorporated into the RFP and contract, as too optimistic.  
The result of this was SWC’s revenue model was way off track.  In order to 
continue to meet obligations SWC needed to compensate for lack of customer 
growth through increased tariff income by price increases.18 
 
                                                     
18
 Siza’s original growth estimates were for 8% annual growth in water volume demand.  This was based on plans for 
new hotels and a variety of elite housing developments.  With these not materialising SWC adjusted their growth 
forecast to 4.5%.  A complicating factor in the area is that many new developments rely on seasonal tourist visitors 
resulting in customer growth not always translating into sustained volume consumption growth – although SWC still 
has to provide infrastructure for maximum demand periods.  If consumption patterns were more even it is likely that 
this could have an impact on the structure of WSS payments and their level.  Although it should be noted that the 
area – at least in terms of its eastern areas is becoming more of a node of permanent residents and commuters and is 
beginning to loose its seasonal shifts. (WZC, 2003; Hultzer (SWC) interview) 
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• The rise in interest rates during this time and weakening currency levels put SWC 
under pressure in terms of meeting its own debt obligations.  In order to 
restructure its debt it needed to secure increased income as a matter of urgency – 
income that could only come from one source, namely tariffs.19 (drawn from 
interviews, Maharaj, 2003; WZC, 2003) 
 
Pricing comparisons are notoriously difficult to do on an accurate basis as arrangements 
are often complex with differing bands of service attracting different pricing.  
Furthermore, public entities often subsidise prices from other sources leading to reduced 
transparency in actual costs.  Nevertheless, some comparisons can me made but these 
should rather be seen in terms of general trends rather than specific arrangements. 
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areas – R/kl 
from pre-
paid meters 
n/a 3,53 3,94  5,45 5,9020 n/a 
Basic sewer 
charge 




Sources: WZC, 2003; Maharaj, 2003, Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002; Mbanjwa (IDM), Hultzer 
(SWC) and Naidoo (IDM) interviews; IDM, 2003 
 
The price comparisons in the above table give a sense of nominal changes since the 
concession became operational.  For level 4 customers these are broadly similar (in some 
                                                     
19
 It should be noted that SWC maintained it was not an option for a corporate bailout by Saur as this would have even 
more widespread ramifications in terms of both the concessionaire and public entity obligations.  In fact it was made 
clear by SWC, that failure to alter tariffs upward and reduce some other obligations (discussed elsewhere) would 
leave them with little choice but to move to termination (Naidoo (IDM) interview). 
20
 Customers are charged a one-off fee of R65 for a pre-paid meter card.  The cards are then recharged by customers as 
and when they wish.  According to SWC officials it is most common for residents using pre-paid meters to re-charge 
their cards with R10 payments.  A sum of R10 will enable water consumption of approximately 1,7kl and lasts and 
average family about two weeks (SWC official, follow up to Hultzer (SWC) interview). 
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cases lower) than equivalent services for water in neighbouring eThekwini Municipality 
(and the Durban Metro prior to this).  The explicit basic sewer charge and related 
volumetric sewer charge (based on 80% of water consumption) is a major point of 
differentiation, both with eThekwini and other IDM municipalities.  However, an 
examination of the investment imperatives and national policy directives which propose 
increasing transparency in sanitation charges, as well as the fact that SWC has been 
required to make on-going capital investments in sewer management and treatment 
would suggest that a case could be made for such charges in established high 
consumption communities.  In affordability terms, the experience from level 4 customers 
in areas such as Nkobongo has been that even the basic sewer charges are unaffordable 
with the result that consumers get cut off and revert to pre-paid meter systems (Hultzer 
(SWC) and Mbanjwa (IDM) interviews).  The introduction of 6kl “free” water in 2002 
adjustments has been criticised in that it has not yet been incorporated into metering 
system for those on level 2 using pre-paid meters (arguably the most needy/poorest 
customers) and with poor customers on level 4 service, whilst they do get 6kl free, they 
still have to pay the basic monthly connection fee.21 
“… there has been no inflation-linked increase of tariffs, except in 1999.  
There have been high escalations in the tariff schedules.  In addition, a basic 
connection charge has been introduced, debunking the concept of “free 
water”.” (Maharaj, 2003: p.272) 
 
Affordability issues remain an ongoing challenge – not just for SWC, but also for IDM as 
the water services authority and many other municipalities around the country.  Free 
basic services have not been introduced in a similar manner in all areas and service 
providers continue to struggle with introducing this in a sustainable manner whilst 
ensuring that they improve collection rates for services more generally.  Hindson and 
Batidzirai (2002), Maharaj (2003) and others are highly critical of the formulation of the 
free basic water policy at a national level, but also of the manner it has been tackled by 
service providers.  Both these authors do detailed analysis of the poorest communities in 
the concession area and make a sound case as to the inappropriateness of the service 
delivery models that have to accommodate free basic services.  Communities are needing 
to allocate high levels of very limited and inconsistent monthly income to service charges 
and transport with the result that the combined effect of basic service delivery and new 
housing has not contributed to their capabilities to escape from poverty.  The crisis the 
concession experienced in the 2000/2001 period carried through to substantial increases 
for all customers.  Whilst level 4 customers experienced a 52% increase between 2001 
and 2003 (for the 7-30kl band) and carried a greater share of rising costs, prep-paid meter 
users also encountered a 38% increase during the same period.  This raises some 
concerns in relation to the degree to which customers, especially those poorest of the 
poor, should be protected from the ramifications of exogenous or endogenous price 
shocks.  This issue takes on added importance in a context where free basic water has not 
yet been extended to pre-paid water-meter customers (although plans are being developed 
to do so). 
 
                                                     
21
 Discussions are advanced between SWC and IDM on the incorporation of a “free water” element to pre-paid 
customers and is likely to be operational in 2004 (Hultzer (SWC) and Naidoo (IDM) interviews). 
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Another contentious issues is that of cut-offs.  For those households on level 4 service 
who do not pay with 60 days of the issuing of a bill their supply is cut off.  It costs the 
households R200, over-and-above settlement of the account to get the supply 
reconnected.  If meters are tampered with by households it will cost them an additional 
R2000 to get the meter repaired and the supply reconnected.  With the decision by 
customers to shift to level two services (ie not to use their household supply either 
because of budgetary reasons or because of being cut off) the concession company has 
seen a marked decline in the number of households in arrears and a decline in cut-offs.  
SWC has responded by increasing the supply of pre-paid meters to areas, despite the 
presence of a level 4 service.  The consequence of this for SWC is that significant risk is 
removed from the service environment as poorer customers move onto the pre-paid 
system.  However, affordability issues remain a concern as do the social consequences of 
not having household connections (such as women having to spend time and energy to 
walk to collect water supplies). 
 
8.2.4 Employment and labour relations 
Disputes over the treatment of labour issues were critical elements in the negotiating of 
the contract for the concession.  At a national level the then Minister of Constitutional 
Development participated in framework agreement discussions with national union 
bodies as part of a central government attempt to secure upfront buy-in into its plans to 
restructure state enterprises and enable municipalities to draw private sector service 
providers into meeting municipal obligations (Naidoo (IDM) and Dawood (IDM 
Councillor) interviews).  However, despite some broad agreement, the government of the 
day and national union bodies have not reached a common understanding of approaches 
to municipal service partnerships (see archive documents at www.cosatu.org.za).  Hence 
when the Dolphin Coast project was proposed Cosatu and Samwu objected both at a local 
and national level.  A series of local and national discussions were facilitated with a focus 
on two different sets of issues:  on the one hand there was the principle of increasing 
private sector involvement and its consequences for workers and the poor, and on the 
other hand was the issue of protection of workers rights should the concession proceed 
(Mathe (Samwu) interview). 
 
Key concerns of the unions in the specific location of the concession were mainly centred 
on the threat of job losses and concerns about the loss of benefits and job security.  These 
aspects were explicitly dealt with in the contract agreement (as discussed previously) in 
order to ensure labour were comfortable with the arrangement.  Furthermore, as part of 
the suspensive conditions attached to the contract it was agreed that an employee share 
ownership scheme would be arranged whereby employees would be allocated four 
percent of the SWC shareholding. 
 
In terms of numbers SWC has been consistent with retaining what it believes is an 
essential level of staffing.  The introduction of dedicated management and technical staff 
when the concession was operationalised in fact increased the number of staff over and 
above those that were transferred.  A number of staff have resigned or passed away and 
there was one dismissal to date of the original complement transferred. 
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Table 6.5 SWC Permanent staff numbers 
01/04/99 April 2001 April 2002 
2422 36 36 
Source: WZC, 2003 
 
All stakeholders recognise that, aside from initial teething problems and a few incidents, 
conditions for staff are meeting expectations (Mathe (Samwu), Mbanjwa (IDM), Dawood 
(IDM Councillor) interviews).  A strong focus of SWC has been on training and 
development of staff.  This has seen a considerable number of staff at all levels 
improving their qualifications enabling them to take on more responsibility.  As wages 
are the second most important contributor to tariff levels (WZC, 2003), SWC has focused 
on ensuring that staff are obtaining additional skills to respond flexibly to increases in 
demand rather than employing additional staff (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  Staff get 
improved salaries where such additional skills are utilised.  A point made by the regional 
secretary for Samwu is that in comparison to municipal training schemes SWC has done 
very well (Mathe (Samwu) interview).  He attributed this to commitments made in the 
contract and indicated that it was generally very difficult to get municipalities to meet 
their obligations.  This is reinforced by the WZC report which states, 
“While Siza employees were significantly capacitated, no training of 
KwaDukuza employees took place during this same period.  Based on the 
under-staffed working conditions and lack of training of the KwaDukuza 
staff, the staff transferred to Siza seem to be in a much more fortunate 
position than their municipal colleagues.” (WZC, 2003: p.38) 
 
Compared to a municipal environment in which hierarchies dominate and duties are 
specifically defined it is clear that one of the strategies SWC had to follow, with the 
requirement to carry all the employees of the former entity, was to improve their 
capabilities to contribute in different ways to the company through multi-skilling.  This 
did enable staff to improve their wages but no figures could obtained to examine the 
degree to which the wage gap between workers and senior managers had been impacted. 
 
Both Maharaj (2003) and Hemson and Batidzirai (2002) interviewed staff and found that 
there were areas of dissatisfaction.  In some instances there are concerns that work loads 
have increased substantially without commensurate remuneration increases.  Concerns 
were also raised about lack of transformation in senior management to reflect local 
population realities.  Hemson and Batidzirai also document some complaints about 
unresponsive management. 
 
8.2.5 Financial performance and investment 
The financial and investment performance of the concession can be said to have been a 
positive one largely due to agreement by the parties to re-negotiate the terms of the 
contract in 2001.  Had this not been done, the project would have collapsed and 
alternative would needed to have been found to deal with the consequences.  This 
                                                     
22
 BODC and Umgeni staff transferred into SWC from first day of operations. 
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subsequent agreement dealt in a fundamental manner with issues relating to finance and 
investment.  In specific terms it involved the following: 
• Halving the annual concession fee that was to be paid to the municipality in terms 
of the original agreement between 1 July 2001 and 31 March 2004 and a similar 
halving of the projected concession fee calculated in the original agreement for 
the period 1 April 2004 to 30 June 2006 (An estimated saving to the 
concessionaire in the region of over R1,25 million); 
• Payment of outstanding rental obligations to the municipality through additional 
revenues captured through an extra-ordinary tariff increase phased in two periods; 
• Adjustment of concessionaire investment commitments for the first five year 
period to R10 million; 
• SWC to reduce its management fee to SAUR Services by 50% until 30 June 2006; 
• Settlement of outstanding debts (an amount of R3 668 331) to the council through 
additional funds secured by SWC from investors and/or borrowing. 
 
The degree to which the concession was in crisis can be seen in terms of the 
supplementary agreement making provision for rapid termination should parties not 
perform in terms of the adjusted agreement: 
“7.4 If the parties have not reached an agreement … within 60 days after 
which either of the Extra-ordinary Tariff Increases should have come into 
operation … but did not so come into operation, the Parties hereby agree, as 
they are entitled to do in terms of clause 68.2 of the Concession Contract, 
that, the Concession Contract will automatically terminate on such 60th day 
without the attribution of fault to either party.” (KwaDukuza Municipality - 
Siza Water Company, Supplementary Agreement 2001: p.5) 
 
The operation, as per SWC’s initial projections, is expected to continued to run at a loss 
into the next five year period, but its should then begin to steadily move into profitability 
during that five year period (Hultzer (SWC) interview).  The change in terms under the 
2001 supplementary agreement is not expected to accelerate the move into profitability as 
the changes merely ensured that SWC could meet its original obligations (Hultzer (SWC) 
and Naidoo (IDM) interviews).  It has been pointed out by Maharaj (2003) that little has 
been forthcoming from SWC in terms of capital sourced from equity investment into the 
concessionaire or debt incurred directly by the concession company.  Investment funds 
have been secured through managing revenue (from tariffs) to under-take necessary 
capital works, developer contributions and loans from various lending entities (Hultzer 
(SWC) interview). 
 
The external review of the concession by WZC (2003) is generally positive about the 
work done by SWC in investment terms to date.  Significant funds have gone into 
replacement of pipes that had been operating beyond their engineering life and were often 
the cause of breaks in service and water loss.  The other key focus has been that of water 
treatment and related sewer systems.  Being a coastal tourism region, and subject to 
careful DWAF monitoring, SWC has progressively upgraded transfer systems for 
sewerage and the actual treatment facility with the result that less overflows into the 
ocean and rivers is taking place and quality of the treatment plant output has been 
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improving (Hultzer (SWC) and Mbanjwa (IDM) interviews).  Nevertheless. some 
commentators remain sceptical about the degree to which the experiences to date could 
be given a clean bill of health: 
“A new tariff deal was structured as SWC failed to pay its annual lease bill to 
the municipality at the end of 2001. … The municipality essentially bailed the 
concessionaire out of commercial failure, which is a common practice that 
seems to pervade privatisation attempts in developing countries. … If this 
pilot project was allowed to fail, it would have had negative implications for 
the continuity of the private sector participation in other municipalities” 
(Maharaj, 2003: p.272-3) 
 
A key point to note in this context – and one reinforced by municipal officials, 
concessionaire management and external parties – is that the investment environment 
under the concession compared to previous operations or other Ilembe services is 
fundamentally different.  Whilst SWC is obliged under the contract to make investments 
in upgrading and maintaining capital equipment and in terms of meeting other 
performance criteria (efficiency and quality), its predecessor and the present systems 
operated by IDM are generally starved of capital investment (Naidoo (IDM), Mbanjwa 
(IDM), Newton (IDM), Bassa (MIIU), Masefield (DWAF) and Hultzer (SWC) 
interviews).  The result of this is that there is very little investment in maintaining 
existing capital equipment.  Any new funds (sourced from grants in the main) go towards 
the pressing need of extending services to unserviced areas.  The result is that municipal 
systems now operated by IDM suffer from efficiency problems and are increasingly 
unreliable.  Dealing with this problem has been identified as important by municipal 
officials, however, they indicate that winning a case for capital upgrades and maintenance 
of core systems and established networks is politically untenable in a situation of such 
dire need by many communities (Naidoo (IDM) interview). 
 
8.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
The concession agreement made specific provision for systems of monitoring and 
evaluation to be in place for the contract.  In this regard, as the municipality did not have 
the necessary skills, it was agreed that the concession fee would be used to contract in 
technical and financial evaluators to provide a monitoring and evaluation service for the 
municipality.  In terms of this arrangement SWC were required to submit monthly 
records on technical, service delivery, customer and financial matters to both municipal 
officials and the external assessors.  After a few minor problems were resolved this 
system was instituted.  However, when the 2001 crisis erupted, it became apparent that 
municipal officials had neither the dedicated time nor in some cases the expertise to 
conduct ongoing monitoring and evaluation, either on the basis of the original reports 
from SWC or in terms of the interpretation reports from the external companies.  This 
was in part due to their attention being diverted by the processes of municipal 
restructuring, but also related to changing personnel.  Despite this problem having been 
identified over two years ago, all parties agree that it remains an area of weakness 
needing much further attention. 
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8.2.7 Governance 
“Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water 
resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society.” 
(Rogers and Hall, 2003: p.7) 
 
Governance arrangements in terms of the concession have been touched upon throughout 
the report but have not been dealt with explicitly.  In this regard governance is taken in its 
broadest sense as referring to the relationship between formal systems of government and 
other stakeholders and citizens, as well as the nature of management and operations 
within the concession company as a private entity.  To quote Rogers and Hall (2003) 
again: 
“Governance matters a great deal for economic, social and environmental 
outcomes.  Some necessary conditions for good governance are inclusiveness, 
accountability, transparency, predictability and responsiveness.” (ibid: p.9) 
 
In the light of this discussion, a number of concerns arise from a cursory examination of 
the governance issues in the case-study concerned: 
• Systems of reporting on the concession and its progress have not been at their 
strongest as they depend very much on monitoring and evaluation systems and 
furthermore, through the various periods of institutional change, reports have not 
been regularly tabled for discussion on an ongoing basis with relevant Council 
committees. 
• SWC’s annual reporting framework is not yet in line with core recommendations 
of the King II and, whilst having started to come to terms with triple bottom-line 
accounting, could still make improvements in this regard. 
• SWCs relationship with its customer base has not been formerly developed to 
create layers of community or customer-based forums where interaction takes 
place to improve services and deal with every-day problems (WZC, 2003). 
• The evolution of IDMs WSA and WSP responsibilities is far from complete and 
careful management of both contracting parties is required to ensure improved 
service delivery is the result. 
 
Global trends in the WSS sector are requiring greater accountability and transparency in 
operations and management.  It is critical that South African role-players align 
themselves with these processes to ensure optimum benefit from concessions and other 
types of arrangements to the citizens in areas in which they operate. 
8.3 Stakeholder perspectives on the implementation phase 
8.3.1 Municipal officials 
To a large degree there is satisfaction amongst municipal officials that implementation of 
the concession agreement since operations began in 1999 has been in line with 
performance expectations.  There appears to be a perspective, shared with management of 
SWC, that the crisis period the concession encountered in 2001 was the result of a lack of 
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experience in the parties drawing up the originating documentation and was more the 
result of unexpected exogenous factors than internal flaws.  A key point raised in the 
discussions has been that the municipal officials dealing with the concessionaire have 
changed three times in the space of four years which has to some degree made the 
interaction between SWC and municipal officials less effective than might have been 
otherwise (Newton (IDM) and Mbanjwa (IDM) interviews).  A senior IDM official 
suggested that one of the key challenges was to re-establish effective reporting lines and 
ensure that monitoring frameworks were effective (Naidoo (IDM) interview). 
8.3.2 Councillors and community 
Price and the nature of the service levels remain an ongoing issue of concern for 
communities and councillor representatives (Maharaj, 2003 and Dawood (IDM 
Councillor) and Ratepayers interviews).  The imbalance in pricing arrangements and 
systems of service delivery between the concession area and areas such as those around 
KwaDukuza (now falling under the IDM water and sanitation services) is also a matter of 
concern.  An IDM official quoted a community leader as stating that whilst there is now 
an integrated local government administration in the region it is peculiar that residents in 
different areas are subject to different pricing and service regimes (Mbanjwa (IDM) 
interview).  However, in terms of quality of services in the SWC area there is an 
appreciation of the fact that the concessionaire does seem to be responsive and is 
progressively dealing with problems (Ratepayers interview). 
8.3.3 Labour 
The senior Samwu official interviewed made the point that in general terms the 
experience for workers in the SWC had been positive, although it was suggested that this 
is the exception in privatisation processes rather than the rule (comparisons were made 
with parastatal restructuring at Telkom where thousands have been retrenched) (Mathe 
(Samwu) interview).  However, in terms of a strategic national perspective by Cosatu and 
Samwu the perspective is still a critical one: 
“The 30 year concession that the Dolphin Coast Municipality signed with 
Siza Water, a subsidiary of Saur International of France, has run into 
problems.  Because the company experienced a shortfall in revenue, the 
contract was re-negotiated and tariffs were raised.  This was done so the 
company would not lose out on the profit it had anticipated.” (Cosatu and 
Samwu, 2003: p.16) 
 
A concern was also expressed about the creation of less distinct job descriptions as 
workers were exposed to more training.  Multi-skilling workers was viewed as a way of 
“getting extra work for little extra pay”. 
8.3.4 Concessionaire management 
From the perspective of SWC management (drawn from an interview with Hultzer 
(SWC)) the concession is steadily moving onto a firmer and firmer footing.  It is argued 
that under concession arrangements where handovers are often complex it usually takes 
more than a handful of years to really see the benefits beyond improved management 
systems.  In this sense it is pointed out that many of the changes first implemented (such 
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as improved information management and upgrading or maintenance of infrastructure) 
are not visible to customers and some stakeholders – yet these are likely to bring 
improved service and efficiency benefits to residents in the longer term.  According to 
SWC management, during such times much pressure is placed on municipal leadership as 
unrealistic expectations are often raised at the start of concessions where people expect 
more immediate changes.  In this regard, the SWC management recognise that the 
survival of the concession during its crisis period had much to do with effective 
administrative and political leadership in working to resolve matters. 
8.3.5 Concluding comments on the perspectives of stakeholders on implementation 
to date 
Whilst the implementation of the concession contract to date has not been without its 
problems, stakeholders seem to be of the opinion that it has begun to live up to 
expectations.  However, there remains a view that more meaningful change in price and 
nature of services offered would be the true test of effectiveness.  In this regard some 
respondents made the case that the concession was accepted only because municipal 
service delivery has not lived up to expectations (Ratepayers, Dawood (IDM Councillor) 
and Mbanjwa (IDM) interviews).  This view was echoed by a senior IDM official who 
made the case that if policy and funding frameworks made allowance for more 
municipalities to have capital and skills they could just as well handle the service (Naidoo 
(IDM) interview).  Furthermore, in terms of WSS policy changes nationally and locally 
(in terms of IDM becoming a Water Services Authority and Water Services Provider) 
there was a view that the concession arrangement removed the best potential revenue 
generator from the public service provider hands. 
 
However, there appears to be strong local acceptance that the concession will run to its 
full projected completion date and that SWC is now part of the service delivery 
environment for the foreseeable future.  Both SWC management and IDM officials make 
the case that, after a period of poor communication and interaction, they are aiming to 
build a stronger partnership to ensure that there is greater alignment and improved 
management (Naidoo (IDM) and Hultzer (IDM) interviews).  Nevertheless, it is clear that 
hurdles remain such as the extension of free basic water to pre-paid meter users and the 
building of a long term strategic relationship between the main partrners. 
 
9. Lessons learnt 
Considering the concession has been in operation for almost five years, there is much that 
could be learnt from experiences related to it.  In the first instance reference is made to 
the lessons identified by the stakeholders in discussion.  This is then supplemented with 





Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 39 
 
9.1 Summary lessons 
Table 7.1 Table of lessons learnt identified by stakeholders 
Stakeholder Lessons identified 
Municipal officials • Institutional and policy certainty is important in ensuring risk reduction 
to both concessionaire and municipality 
• Capacity building for all stakeholders is essential 
• Crisis periods will occur – they do with municipalities so why not with 
concessions? – capacity is needed to handle these and resolve them 
• Monitoring and evaluation systems must be built up 
• Concession arrangements enable maintenance and upgrading of 
core infrastructure – municipalities struggle with this as trend is to 
spend grant income on extension of service and little income is 
sourced from operational income to reinvest 
• Policy clarity is required on issues such as free basic water, 
allocation of grants in concession areas etc 
 
Councillor • Easier for non-Council structure to enforce payment 
• Concessionaire invests capital and maintenance funds whilst 
municipalities struggle to do this 
• WSA capacity building for municipality will assist in ensuring better 
performance in future 
• A forum should be created in concession area which meets regularly 
to discuss service issues and should involve councillors, municipal 
officials, concession management and community structures 
• Buy in of labour and community is important to ensure concession 
can operate 




• Institutional and policy certainty is important in ensuring risk reduction 
to both concessionaire and municipality 
• Municipalities need capacity building to perform in terms of their 
contract obligations 
• Boundaries of concession area need to be very carefully thought 
through 
• Leadership capacity (officials and political leaders) is essential in 
making a concession work (both in its early stages to protect it from 
unwarranted attacks and when crisis periods occur) 
• Improved regulation is required in terms of how municipalities handle 
their own investment processes related to WSS so as not to create 
an imbalance reflected in prices 
• Policy clarity is required on issues such as free basic water, 
allocation of grants in concession areas etc 
• The presence of a trusted broker such as MIIU is important 
 
Ratepayers • Pre-concession stakeholder processes must be more thorough to 
equip for participation and to deal with crisis periods 
• Private concession routes do not mean cheaper services but do bring 
service quality improvements 
• Transparency and involvement in contract processes is important 
• Monitoring and evaluation are important and generally not handled 
well by municipalities 
• International companies do not necessarily bring anything special – 
South Africans could do this 
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Stakeholder Lessons identified 
• Procedures for setting up such arrangements should be more 
specific in terms of levels of involvement 
• Citizens remain on the outside of Siza decision making processes – 
working through Council structures is not enough 
 
Labour • Pre-concession stakeholder processes must be more thorough to 
equip for participation and to deal with crisis periods 
• Transparency and involvement in contract processes is important 
• At a minimum the rights of existing service employees must be 
protected in contract form 
• National dialogue is very important as there is no consensus on the 
issue of privatisation 
• Involvement of workers in shareholding secures their buy in 
 
MIIU • Pre-concession stakeholder processes must be more thorough to 
equip for participation and to deal with crisis periods 
• Information on which concession deals are based must be 
independently tested 
• Institutional and policy certainty is important in ensuring risk reduction 
to both concessionaire and municipality 
 
DWAF • Ongoing effort is required to secure municipal capacity to ensure 
management of concessionaire is handled effectively (especially 
monitoring and evaluation) 
• Policy direction is needed in more precise terms on free basic 




Other lessons documented in various studies and gained from the process of this project 
include the following: 
• Effort needs to be made to manage expectations of all parties at the start of the 
concession.  Understanding evolution paths and how these will impact on 
stakeholders is essential 
• Include non-Council stakeholders in formal capacity building processes such as 
learning trips and seminars 
• Ensure a full independent review of all information feeding into contracts (over 
and above contracted advisors) 
• Dispute/crisis resolution mechanisms must be given priority in capacity building 
and contractual processes – crises are bound to happen in both the originating 
entity and in the concession company 
• Trusted broker role of DBSA/MIIU is essential from perspective of 
concessionaire and municipality 
• Different service providers, systems and price scales side-by-side creates 
problems 
• Institutional know-how is often lost in municipal restructuring processes 
• Informal relationships of trust and understanding are essential 
• Greater focus on economy of scale matters must feed into processes 
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• Dealing with matters such as by-laws is an ongoing challenge and impacts on the 
concession directly – it must be accorded some priority 
• The concessionaire and municipality should increasingly move to more precise 
longer term tariff commitments and targets rather than only utilise inflation-based 
adjustments 
• Customer relations and communication must be upgraded and worked on 
continuously 
• Fulfilling contract obligations is time-consuming and expertise intensive – more 
time and capacity needs to be set aside for this to make sure plans are not rushed 
through and important issues not neglected 
• The contract documents must talk to governance expectations of the various 
parties to the agreement and other stakeholders 
• Concessions or similar arrangements should consider having built in protection 
mechanism for the poorest customers when price shocks occur 
 
9.2 Replicability of lessons 
It is important to note that not all lessons learnt from this project are replicable in other 
environments.  It has been argued by Maharaj (2003) that the replicability of experience 
is limited as, 
“the possibilities for a more facilitative environment for privatisation [than 
that pertaining at the BODC at the start of the concession] seems highly 
unlikely, however, considering Dolphin Coast’s charismatic status over a 
significant period time.” (Maharaj, 2003:p.284) 
Maharaj goes on to argue that the concession arrangement is not sustainable in that it has 
received undue attention and support without which it could not have progressed: 
“The imminent project failure had prompted the municipal authorities to 
intervene to vastly increase the WSS tariffs and decrease lease payments.  
The project continued solely on the municipality’s cushioning of the 
concessionaire from failure.” (Maharaj, 2003: p.284) 
 
Despite these reservations, stakeholders are of the view that other municipalities, WSS 
stakeholders and stakeholders in general could gain from an examination of the 
experiences, both positive and negative.  SWC and the various incarnations of local 
government over time have played host to many delegations seeking to gain from the 
local experiences.  Stakeholders also make the point that the concession is a work in 
progress – whilst many of its parameters are formalised in contractual terms the changing 
environment will require adjustments, some of them painful to either parties or other 
stakeholders, in the future.  In this sense support and learning must be an ongoing 
enterprise and not limited to pre-concession and early concession processes.  Parties 
involved in the concession are also not averse to the concession being subject to piloting 
of new initiatives and processes such as more innovative service delivery arrangements 
provided risk is shared adequately with relevant national government role players. 
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Clearly each concession scenario is likely to be different.  For instance, in the former 
Dolphin Coast area concession examined in this report, the restructuring process that took 
place impacted directly on a limited number of staff without strong union affiliations.  In 
a context where greater numbers of staff were to be involved and the union presence was 
strong it is possible that different outcomes could have resulted.  Other factors include 
those relating to the specific socio-economic and demographic contexts which have 
impacts on models of service provision and the complexity of the operating environment.  
For example. relatively new and unstable residential areas present different challenges to 
older districts.  In this context much caution should be exercised to make sweeping 
statements on the relevance of one concession experience in a different context.  The 
difficulties experienced in Nelspruit or the Eastern Cape in similar endeavours reinforce 
the fact that circumstances and local conditions matter. 
 
9.3 Some reflections on international experience23 
It is worthwhile to briefly touch on international experience before advancing on to 
recommendations.  A scan of material on water and sanitation service delivery in the rest 
of the world suggests that there is a plethora of different approaches that various 
countries have adopted.  The move away from traditional state managed service delivery 
first took root in developed country contexts as governments began to restructure public 
services24 motivated by a variety of circumstances (and ideological perspectives) 
including: 
• Budgetary constraints limiting re-investment; 
• Efficiency limitations in large bureaucratic entities; and 
• Pressure from the private sector to introduce markets in traditional monopoly 
environments. 
 
However, it did not take long, for the then rather limited experience of the involvement of 
the private sector in the full chain of activities relating to the supply of WSS, to find its 
way into donor and multi-lateral organisation programmes for developing countries.  The 
case that was being made was simple: weak developing country states were making little 
inroads into the delivery of basic water and sanitation services to their citizens.  Despite 
considerable experimentation and testing of new partnership models in the past two 
decades there remains much still to be done to advance the supply of basic services.  
Involvement of the private sector in developing country WSS has been patchy with 
failure being as common, if not more common, than success.  However, lessons have 
been learnt through these processes and there is increasing recognition that private sector 
involvement by itself is no panacea.  In this regard much of the literature examining these 
experiences places emphasis on matters such as (drawn from Rogers and Hall, 2003): 
• Governance systems relating to the exercise of state power; 
• Governance systems of the private role players involved in WSS; 
                                                     
23
 This section consists of the author’s interpretation of a series of articles reflecting on international experience.  A 
selection of references can be found at the end of the article. 
24
 Although a country such as France has had private involvement in WSS for over 150 years (The Economist, 2003) 
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• Coherence and appropriateness of policy frameworks, especially with regard to 
pricing, legislation governing WSS and service models (investment and 
infrastructure intensive vs alternatives such as community-managed networks); 
• Effectiveness of regulation; and 
• Concerns at the continued exclusion of the poor from access to basic services. 
 
Today, even where the private sector is not involved directly in the management of WSS, 
it is likely to be heavily involved in providing contracted services to WSS providers 
through supply of specialist engineering support, construction of facilities, machinery and 
finance to name but a few (Muller 2003).  In this sense an undeclared partnership has 
been operating in much of the service pipeline for a considerable period of time.  There 
exists a strong rationale, in these circumstances, for government to draw on new 
approaches to “good governance” by seeking to make these partnerships relevant and 
appropriate with those still outside the serviced environment.  Equally governments have 
much to learn and reflect on in terms of citizen engagement and participation in the 
process of governance to enhance accountability and service quality.  Increasing 
recognition that the rigidity of past frameworks – whether they were state-centred or 
partnership based – circumscribed innovation and flexibility has today stimulated a 
vibrant debate on what is in the best interests of citizens.  WSS PPPs should not be 
structured in a manner that leaves them immune to these processes and neither should 
state-centred delivery systems or those where private sector involvement dominates.  
Water’s status as a “special” public good requires that above all else role-players 
involved in its management and delivery must act with transparency and openness ensure 
that actions purported to be in the interests of all do not merely reinforce patterns of 
exclusion so common throughout the world today. Franceys and Weitz (2003) conclude 
their review of international examples by arguing that, 
“…civil society, poverty aware intermediaries, are needed for their flexibility and 
commitment to serve the poorest whereas the private sector is needed to disturb the 
old system of service provision and manage it more efficiently, all under the 
oversight of government as economic regulator and facilitator.  None of these 
‘partners’ appears capable of meeting the needs of the poorest in the rapidly 
growing urban areas on their own.” (Franceys and Weitz, 2003: p.1096) 
  
10. Recommendations 
Emerging from this study, the following key recommendations are proposed: 
 
• South Africa still has a very complex and evolving situation with respect to 
regulation of WSS.  Recent policy and legislative processes have begin to address 
this but considerable effort needs to be put into upgrading these systems – 
especially where they concern WSP arrangements.  According to DWAF sources 
more often then not it is municipal service providers that do not conform to 
regulatory requirements – but as different WSP systems proliferate the 
management and regulation of these will become more complex for WSAs and 
other role-players.  Setting common national standards on matters of pricing, 
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quality, service provision, service delivery options, customer rights have been part 
of recent policy processes but actual enforcement remains limited.  Regulation 
can of course become a problem if taken too far to exclude local innovation, but is 
could contribute to risk reduction and greater certainty for stakeholders.  The 
issue of how municipalities handle grants and their own budget allocations needs 
serious attention so that deterioration of delivery systems does not threaten long 
term sustainability.  Lack of policy clarity in this regard will continue to see 
municipalities opting for short-term service extension at the cost of maintenance 
and core capital works. 
 
• An opportunity exists for municipalities to be innovative with public private 
partnerships and for them to test a variety of different models.  Management 
contracts appear to be underutilised in a context where municipalities struggle to 
perform their core functions.  Innovation could also extend to joint ventures or 
other arrangements with private and other public or semi-public entities.  From 
the Dolphin Coast environment it appears that inclusion of new service 
opportunities in the concession combined with direct technical support for 
municipal operations could be explored to the benefit of both parties and 
customers and citizens more generally (especially where concerns exist about 
concessions cherry-picking).  National structures could contribute to such 
innovation partnerships where a measure of risk is shared by all parties.  This 
innovation should not just be about services and pricing, but also involve matters 
of governance and participation. 
 
• Role-players active in the WSS environment could do more work to address pre-
conditions which enable both effective public, public-private and private service 
delivery.  An essential element of these pre-conditions is the leadership capacity 
amongst officials, politicians and technical support operations in municipal 
environments.  This remains a matter of concern in many instances and could 
result in abuse by one or other party as has been seen in international experiences. 
 
• Core partners involved in the processes must subject themselves to ongoing 
evaluation and learning to ensure that opportunities for improvement are not 
missed.  This involves shared learning and empowerment.  So for instance it is 
clear that private role-players could benefit from improved knowledge and 
understanding of community participation processes that public bodies might be 
more familiar with. 
 
• Building capacity to enable stakeholders and parties to agreements to deal with 
crises is critical.  Changes in policy contexts, institutional flux, economic 
instability and other unforeseen risks all contribute to an environment in which 
change is guaranteed over extended concession periods.  Contract flexibility, for 
example in defining five year planning horizons, is essential.  However, this needs 
to be complemented, in the absence of effective regulators and obvious mediating 
parties, with support enabling parties to emerge from points of crisis on a stronger 
rather than weaker footing. 
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• Some consideration needs to be given to the matter of protecting the poor from 
the impact of price shocks in the provision of a basic need such as water.  This 
needs to be informed by national policy, which should make more explicit 
regulatory provision on matters concerning both exogenous and endogenous 
shocks with resultant price impacts.  Whilst it is municipalities that need to agree 
to price frameworks, and whilst it is also true that municipalities are not by any 
means immune from such shocks, options do exists to deal with this matter 
specifically in contracts relating to obligations of various parties in concessions.  
This is particularly true in a context where free-basic water has not been 
effectively extended to all households in need. 
 
11. Conclusion 
The water and sanitation service concession in the former Dolphin Coast area has begun 
to mature into a more effective partnership.  This maturing is taking place after the 
partnership has been through periods of severe strain and stress from policy and 
institutional changes, unforeseen exogenous shocks and close scrutiny by a range of 
stakeholders.  Despite the upheaval that came with these circumstances the concession is 
showing some considerable improvements to the previous service, comparable services 
and its early period of operations.  However, expectations of all stakeholders remain very 
high and there remains a measure of disquiet about the degree to which all parties feel 
opportunities have been maximised.  The level of leadership shown by contract parties 
and stakeholders over the next few years will determine whether or not the partnership 
creates new opportunities, especially in terms of rising levels of service to the poor, or 
merely delivers the minimum in terms of contract obligations. 
 
Stakeholder perspectives documented in the report and supporting analysis makes a clear-
cut case for ongoing and innovative support to those parties interested in and affected by 
municipal service partnerships such as the Siza Water concession.  This support needs to 
be broadened to equip a wider body of stakeholders and carry with it a strong governance 
enhancement agenda.
Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 46 
 
Documents and reference material 
 
Bernstein A and Clynick T, “Local government’s crunch time”, in Business Day, 
01/10/2003, p.11 
Cosatu, “Shock at Dolphin Coast water deal”, press statement issued by Cosatu 
Communications Department, 8 February 1999 
Cosatu, “Cosatu submission on the water regulations”, from www.cosatu.org.za, October 
2000 
Cosatu and Samwu, “Joint submission by Cosatu and Samwu on the draft white paper on 
water services”, from www.cosatu.org.za, March 2003 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, “Municipal Structures Act”, 1998 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, “Municipal Structures Amendment 
Act”, 2000 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, “Municipal Systems Act”, 2000 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, “A citizen’s guide to municipal service 
partnerships”, undated 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, “Strategic Framework for Water Services”, 
2003 
Dolphin Coast Municipality and Siza Water Company Pty (Ltd), “Water and sanitation 
concession agreement”, 1999 
Franceys R and Weitz A, “Public-Private Community Partnerships in Infrastructure for 
the Poor” in Journal of International Development, 15 (8), 2003 
Galvin M and Habib A, “The politics of decentralisation and donor funding in South 
Africa’s rural water sector”, CCS Research Report no 2, Centre for Civil Society, 
undated 
Hemson D and Batidzirai H, “Public private partnerships and the poor: A case study of 
the Dolphin Coast water concession, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa” in Sohail M 
(ed), Public Private Partnerships and the Poor, WEDC, 2002 
Ilembe District Municipality, Integrated Development Plan, 2002 
Ilembe District Municipality, “Water Services Development Plan”, prepared by Davies, 
Lynn & Partners and MultiConsult Engineering, 2003 
Ilembe District Municipality, Integrated development Plan Review, 2003 
Ilembe District Municipality, “Explanation of the Water and Sewer Tariff” note for 
Council, 2003 
KwaDukuza Municipality and Siza Water Company Pty (Ltd), “Supplementary 
agreement to Water and sanitation concession agreement”, 2001 
KwaDukuza Local Municipality, Integrated Development Plan, 2002 
Lumsden F and Loftus A, “Inanda’s struggle for water through pipes and tunnels”, CCS 
Research Report, Centre for Civil Society, University of Natal, undated 
Maharaj A, “Sustainable private sector participation in water supply and sanitation? An 
investigation of the South African experience with international comparative case 
studies”, unpublished Phd thesis, University of Natal, 2003 
McDonald D, “The Bell Tolls for Thee: Cost recovery, cut offs, and the affordability of 
municipal services in South Africa”, Municipal Services Project Special Report, 
Queens University, Canada, March 2002 
MIIU and NBI, “Dolphin Coast and Siza Water”, Partnerships, vol 2, July 1999 
Ilembe – Siza Water Case Study    Page 47 
 
Muller M, “Public-Private Partnerships in Water: A South African Perspective on the 
Global Debate” in Journal of International Development, 15 (8), 2003 
NBI (www.pppcentre.com), “Case Study: The Nelspruit Concession”, from 
pppcentre.com web site 
Rogers P and Hall A, “Effective water governance”, TEC Background Papers no 7, 
Global Water Partnership Technical Committee, 2003 
Robbins P, “Transnational Corporations and The Discourse of Water Privatization”, in 
Journal of International Development, 15 (8), 2003 
The Economist, “Priceless: A survey of water”, July 19th 2003 
WZC (Werner Zybrands Consulting), “Evaluation report of Dolphin Coast Water and 
Sanitation Concession Agreement”, prepared for Municipal Infrastructure 















List of interviews 
Name Organisation Position Date interviewed 
Mark Hultzer (SWC) Siza Water Manager: Operations 16/10/03 
24/11/03 
Mike Newton (IDM) Ilembe District 
Municipality 
Director: Planning and 
LED 
21/11/03 
Rina Freeman, Tina 
Cooke and George ? 










Angela Masefield DWAF Deputy Regional Director 19/11/03 





(also former employee of 
Siza Water and Umgeni 
Water) 
Manager: Water and 
Sanitation 
21/11/03 
Asha Bassa (MIIU) MIIU Business Development 
Manager 
04/11/03 
Jogie Naidoo (IDM) Ilembe District 
Municipality 
Head: Technical Services 08/12/03 
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SIZA WATER CONCESSION AREA
LEVEL OF SEWAGE SERVICE AS PROPOSED IN THE FIVE YEAR PLAN











LEVEL 2: VENTILATED, IMPROVED PIT LATRINE
LEVEL 3: IN-HOUSE WATERBORNE SEPTIC TANK
LEVEL 4: WATERBORNE SANITATION TO A SEWER
FOXHILL
TAFFENI
LEVEL 2 COMBINED WITH LEVEL 4
LEVEL 3 COMBINED WITH LEVEL 4
